Becoming a Parent in a Post-Communist Society: an Analysis of Ideational Factors

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Abstract

Draft - do not quote, remarks and suggestions are welcomed!

The move from an early fertility to a "new", late fertility model is characteristic for each post-communist societies including the Hungarian one, and is the basic reason for low period fertility. The offered approaches explaining the changes, such as the second demographic transition theory, the economic crisis hypothesis, the disorderliness approach, can be located in a space stretching between structural and cultural explanations. Using two waves of an ongoing follow-up survey, we will be able to show "selection" effects of cultural factors on childbearing behaviour and at the same time control for some structural factors. The effects of religiosity, child related norms (ideal age and ideal number of children), individualism- and anomie-scale, and optimism are analysed in our models. Using parallel logistic regression models for male and female on the one side, and first and further births on the other side, we could show and compare influences of ideational factors.

Key words: fertility transition, post-communist countries, ideational factors

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1. Introduction

At the start of the new decade in 1990, the Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe witnessed the beginnings of a fundamental political, social and economical transition, in the course of which the centralized power structures in these countries came to be supplanted by competitive democracy and the state-ownership-based redistributive economy with a private-ownership-based market economy. The process triggered a social transformation and resulted in radical demographic changes. In the area of family formation, these countries saw the rapid spread of cohabitation, an increasing ratio of non-marital births, an increase – which to this day still goes on in many countries – in the mean age of first birth, while, for these and other reasons, the number of actual live births has decreased drastically. All these changes clearly indicated that the reproductive model of the highly centralized state-socialist system, characterized by early entry into marriage, early parenthood, low rate of childlessness, the dominance of two-children, two-earner families, was undergoing a transformation. (Frejka 1980, Kamarás, 2003).

The changes of family formation and the decrease in fertility had begun to be observed at least two decades earlier in Western Europe, though its intensity and dynamics varied from country to country. It is no coincidence then that the explanations – or as Van de Kaa put it, ”narratives” (Van de Kaa 1996) -- offered earlier for the changes in fertility (cf. Andorka 1978) have become the focus of attention again. Perhaps the most widely accepted theory explaining the new phenomena was that of the “second demographic transition” put forward by van de Kaa and Lesthaeghe. (van de Kaa 1987, L5esthaeghe, 199) These approach put a premium on the determining roles of ideational factors. This has again trained the spotlight on the question whether economic and structural (social structural) or ideational (value system) interpretations were more helpful in understanding the changes in childbearing behaviors and fertility.

The paradigm of the “second demographic transition” developed to describe the changes in Western Europe was already “available” at the turn of 1989 and 1990, when the radical demographic changes in the former state socialist countries begun, thus it is not surprising that it was not only taken into consideration but also became the most widely accepted “narrative” of the demographic transition of the post-Communist countries. (Lesthaeghe, Surkyn 2004, Rychterikova 1999, Sobotka et. al. 2003)[1] Naturally, new theories explaining the changes were also put forward, such as the hypothesis of “economic crisis” (Macura et. al. 1999, 2000) which belongs to the family of economic narratives and the hypothesis of “social anomie” (Philipov 2003, Philipov et. al. 2006) which focused on the uneven tempo of development in culture and in

[1] In the biannual conferences of the SDT Working Group formed in the EAPS, this issue was constantly on the agenda, just like at EAPS conferences (See for instance, the podium debate at the EPC2003 conference in Warsaw, cf. Vienna Yearbook of Population Research , 2004, p.1-34.)

structure. These approaches can be situated in the space stretching between the logic of economic (structural) explanations and the logic of ideational (behaviorist) explanations[2].

It is no accident that the existing theories are being used to understand and explicate the transformations occurring in the former Communist countries, since the characteristics of change – spread of cohabitation, increased ratio of non-marital births, postponement of childbearing – are identical to the tendencies found in Western Europe. At the same time, future research must take into consideration the somewhat different "starting point" of the transformations in former Communist countries. This difference is manifested not only in demographic indicators, but also in the social context. Not only was marriage and the two-children family model more widespread and parenthood timed to occur earlier than in Western European counties, but full-time female employment was universal and the system of childcare and child support was well developed.

The primary goal of this paper is to study whether value-orientations and attitudes play some kind of role in becoming a parent, in the birth of the first child and in having further children, and if so, whether males and females are motivated by the same factors and whether these factors operate the same way in the case of the first and the subsequent (second and third) children. In the course of our research, we tried to take into consideration those above-mentioned approaches (to be detailed in the forthcoming) that attribute a significant role to value-orientations and attitudes. Needless to say, our approach could not be all-inclusive, therefore our analysis will necessarily be limited in scope.

This paper does not contain a detailed analysis of the impact of structural factors (education, income) – we will use these in our models as controlling factors. Therefore we will not be able to provide an answer to the question whether structural or ideational explanations are more insightful – we will only be able to see which factors of the ideational explanations were "operational" in a country experiencing a transition from Communism to a market economy.

In the rest of the paper, we will first briefly review the most fundamental theoretical approaches as well as the social contexts in which we analyze childbearing behavior. Next, we will present the dependent and independent variables used in the course of the analysis. The analysis itself will be performed in two stages, and each stage in two steps. We will employ the method of logistical regression when looking at the factors surrounding (1) the birth of the first child, and (2) the birth of the second and third children.

2. Theoretical approaches and difficulties of interpreting the results

[2] We purposely refer to "space" here for the typical explanations always contain elements that belong to an alternative logic.

Before detailing our empirical analysis, we would like to briefly delve into two relevant issues. First, we will sketch out the theoretical approaches incorporating ideational factors, narrowing our focus on those that treat the demographic impact of the social transition from Communism to market economy and those that are going to be significant from the perspectives of variable-creation to be applied. Secondly, we will point out certain methodological problems that are certain to make the interpretation of the results difficult.

2.1. Theoretical approaches considered

According to the *theory of second demographic transition,* value changes play a decisive role in changing family formation, in the decrease in fertility and the postponement of becoming a parent (first child). Quality of partnerships becomes more important and self-realization more significant at the time when local and religious communities are disintegrating, thereby weakening the strength of community norms and the role of sanctions and rewards, all of which contribute to the transformation of family formation and of becoming a parent. Of course the authors Lesthaeghe and Moors also emphasize the role of structural factors – the spread of female employment, the high level of economic well-being – but they regard them as preconditions for the changes in value-orientations. (Lesthaeghe, Moors 2000).

The role of social disintegration – *anomie* – is highlighted in researches dealing with fertility declines in former state socialist countries (Philipov. 2003). This explanation is also rooted in the tradition of ideational approaches since it assumes a crisis and vacuum of values created in the wake of the political regime change – it postulates, in other words, a context in which former values are losing their power but new values could not (yet) become regulators of behavior. This becomes manifest in feelings of powerlessness, lack of orientation and the breaking of rules (normlessness). Needless to say, this approach also acknowledges that the state of discontinuity is a consequence of structural factors, of the political regime change, of the transformation of institutional, social and economic structures.

The intensifying experience of *insecurity* – regardless whether the theories attribute it to globalization or to political transitions – is treated regularly in papers discussing the postponement of childbearing. There are two approaches to be found in the relevant literature. Ranjan points out that insecurity*, ceteris paribus*, results in decline in fertility (Ranjan 1999). Another hypothesis, conversely, points out that having children can actually be an "instrument" of reducing insecurity (Fridman, et.al. 1999). In other words, those who feel more insecure will have more children.

Approaches stressing the subsequent waves of *individualization* (Beck 1986; Beck Beck-Gernsheim 1990; Friedrich 1998), elements of which also form a part of the concept of the second demographic transition, assume a weakening of communal control mechanisms and the disappearance of class distinctions and related prescriptions (norms) and sanction mechanisms. The behavior-regulation vacuum may be filled by maximizing the cost-benefit ratio, in other words, a calculating behavior that influences childbearing decisions. Other views hold that there exist in society certain stable and easily identifiable value orientations (Hakim 2003) which of course influence childbearing in various different ways. Those views which attribute a determining influence on decisions to *age-norms* (Billari, Liefbroer 2007, Hagestaad, Neugarten 1985) presume an impact mechanism and positioning for norms that are different from what they had been in the past. According to this view, the role of the general group- and community norms is being taken over by age-norms generated by the institutional setting of the welfare state. The view that holds that the ideal number of children expresses a community norm, since it constitutes a sort of point of reference and thus a behavior-regulating function, postulate the survival of norms into the modern society (S. Molnar 2003) as well.

The concept of "planned behavior" -- first worked out by Fishbein and Ajzen and then developed further – is often utilized these days in order to understand the components of childbearing behavior. (e.g. Liefbroer 2002). According to the authors of the concept, childbearing intentions – which have a decisive impact on childbearing decisions – are shaped in their development by three sets of factors: first, cost-benefit considerations which assess the consequences of the decision from a number of perspectives; second, fertility norms and attitudes; and thirdly, perceived control mechanisms, i.e. expectations that ensure the behavior-regulating functioning of norms. Norms and values enjoy an independent and special role in this socio-psychology-rooted approach.

Even though it has not (yet) come into the foreground in the course of interpreting the transition from Communism to market economy, we must mention the part perceived gender roles play in childbearing decisions. A great number of works seem to agree that a traditional conception of gender roles enables an earlier childbearing and results in higher number of children (S. Molnár, 1999) The transformation of gender roles and of conceptions thereof constitute an organic part of the concept of second demographic transition, since this is held to be one of the engines of the transformation of partnerships (Lesthaeghe 1995). A key element in the concept of "developmental idealism" worked out by Thornton is that the idea of equality impacts childbearing and restructures intra-family relations. (Thornton 2005) It is no accident, however, that these ideas are rarely applied to the conditions in former state socialist countries. In these societies, a forced egalitarisation took place in times of centralization and from the early

1950s on, as the economy demanded the compulsory employment of women. As a result, the desire for traditional gender roles existed side-by-side with a practice which only partially realized the official ideology of equality. In this paper we cannot treat this ambivalence and its consequences in detail (cf. Pongrácz 2001, Blaskó 2006) while it is quite obvious that we cannot forego the measurement of the impact of ideas on gender roles in our analysis.

We need to recall the most important structural factors as well, not only for the sake of completeness, but also for the purpose of the forthcoming development of the control variables, too. Structural approaches interpreting the drastic fertility decline in former state socialist countries blame the consequences of *economic crisis* – i.e. the decline in economic output, emergence of mass unemployment, the instability of employment and insecurity of income and wages, etc. – for the parents' decision of postponing or rejecting having children. (Macura, et.al., 1999., 2000) Burdened with the circumstances of economic crisis and instability, people "struggle to survive" and only want to "muddle through" and will therefore postpone long-term decisions such as childbearing.

Economic transition meant more than just economic regression: it also opened the way for many hitherto limited or forbidden activities and resulted in an abundance of consumption opportunities. All of this resulted directly in the raising of aspirations in a time period when the realization of consumption opportunities became constrained, or at least were realized to different degrees in the various social groups. When we assumed that besides the objective material circumstances, the perspectives and outlooks people had on their own situations also impacted their willingness to have children, we made use of the concept of *relative deprivation* of Merton and Easterlin (Merton 1980, Easterlin 1987, Crimmins et. al. 1991).

As far as objective or structural circumstances are concerned, we should of course take an extremely high number of factors – economic activity, income, the sector the workplace belongs to, housing conditions, highest level of education as status indicator and so on – into consideration but we cannot possibly review these even perfunctorily. We would only like to point out that as far as economic activity is concerned, fertility decline in the former state socialist countries was in large part due to the radically rising number of students enrolled in various schools as a consequence of the *education expansion.* It is widely acknowledged that such student status is hardly compatible with childbearing (Blossfeld-Huinik 1991.)

Further research needs to be conducted to explore the impact of the *transformation of partnerships* on childbearing as well as the mutual influence of childbearing and partnership behavior on each other. No doubt, the spread of cohabitation and the increasing instability of partnerships exert an influence on childbearing and might have played a key role in the decline of fertility. (Frejka, Rossi 2001) This correlation occupies a central place in the concept of the

second demographic transition. The impact of ideational factors can be indirectly detected in the transformation of partnerships (spread of divorce and cohabitation). In this paper, however, we can only briefly treat the state and dynamics of partnerships[3].

2.2. Considerations making the interpretation of results difficult

(Historical context) We indicated earlier in this paper that we are looking at ideational factors in a society in transition, at the turn of 2000/2001, quite probably in the last phase of the transition period. In the first years of the new millennium the radical shift in behavior, the drastic transformation of family formation were not yet over in Hungary (Kamarás 2003, Spéder 2006) though some indicators in the Czech Republic indicate that the process might be coming to an end there. One of the most significant indicators of transformation and postponement is the average age at the birth of the first child. (Figure 1) This in 1990 was 23.0 years for women. A decade later it was a full two years higher (25.0). It continued to increase and was at 26.5 at the time of the second wave of data collection. Similar continuous increase was recorded in the mean ages of people having their second and third children. Our analysis thus concentrates on a period – from 2001 to late 2005 – when the postponement of becoming parents was not yet over.

Figure 1
Mothers mean age at first, second and third births, Hungary, 1989—2005



Source: Demographic Yearbooks,vital statistics, HCSO

[3] We treated the fundamental correlations in this area in Speder 2006

This context will affect the interpretation of the results. If we wanted to arrive at a clear picture of what roles ideational factors played in the demographic transition, we would have to model demographic behaviors at three different points of time, at least: prior to the start of changes, in the midst of them and at the end of the process. For this, we would require comparable indicators measuring ideational factors from each period. Models constructed on the basis of such data could allow us to deduce the roles of ideational factors in the transition. This, however, is something we cannot do, since we are measuring values and attitudes in the last phase of the transition at a given period (turn of 2001/2002). Our results then contain two inseparable effect mechanisms: the ideational effects prevalent at the final period of the transition as well as those correlations that are going to differentiate childbearing behavior in the new reproductive models yet to emerge. We will have to bear all of this in mind when interpreting the results.

(*Macro-level theories vs. micro-level analysis*) As we have seen, theoretical approaches articulate hypotheses relevant to the various levels of demographic conditions and fertility processes. Some analyses, especially the more comprehensive ones, concentrate on social conditions on the macro-level, while others focus on the acts and decisions of the individual. These cohort or group-specific behaviors are often presented as individual actions. Analyses rarely discuss how individual behavior becomes group behavior, what the social distribution of these groups are (type of inhomogeneity) and how all these come together to form of social relations. Or, looking at if from the other angle: how macro-conditions (anomie, secularization, economic inequalities) impact group behavior. Our empirical analysis is based on a *micro data system recorded of individuals* and the applied methodology of logistical regression allows us to look at whether or not groups possessing specific attitudes and cultural traits are going to exhibit childbearing behavior markedly different from the reference group. But how are we to interpret our results? If people who are more "individualistic" are less likely to have children, it would be an oversimplification to say that the spread of individualism has a determining effect on childbearing. It is a reasonable assumption to say that today, people are more individualistic therefore fewer children are being born – but we cannot discount the possibility that fewer children are born to those who are family-oriented as well. Furthermore, it is also possible that there is no increase in the number of individualistic people – they only have fewer children than before. In other words, we need to be cognizant of the behavior changes of the various groups and the changes in distribution by the specific indicators, in order to be able to draw consistent conclusions. Since our data does not make this possible, we need to exercise extra caution when arriving at conclusions.

(*Values: Selection and/or adaptation*) Researchers have for a long time clung to the notion that values are constant and the value changes in a society come into being with the influx of the new

generations, with their entry into society. (Inglehart 1987, Moors 1997) If this were true, the strong correlation between the indicators of demographic behavior (mean age of becoming a parent, number of children) and the attitudes and orientations recorded at the same time would be due to the impact of values (selection effect). (If, of course, we controlled for all other effects). But demographers researching the effects of life course events (Beets et al 1997, Liefbroer, 2002, Waite et. al. 1986) pointed out the phenomenon of adaptation – i.e. the fact that as a consequence of certain events, attitudes closely bound up with its object may undergo a change and the spread of new modes of behavior is followed by the adaptation of value orientations and attitudes. As it is well-known from the relevant literature, it is essential to conduct a follow-up survey in order to be able to separate the effects of these mechanisms[4] This motive was of central importance to the development of the "Generation and Gender Program" (GGP) (cf. Vikat, et.al. 2005) and to that of our Hungarian research program "*Turning Points of the Life Course*" which was created in cooperation with and as a part of GGP, but which also exhibits some divergences from it (Spéder 2001). To manage this problem, in our research we will use models containing such ideational features that clearly described the individuals even before the given event.

The majority of analyses exploring the effect of values tend to demonstrate the effects of norms and attitudes closely related to family and fertility (Barber, et.al., 2002; Liefbroer 2002; Thomson 2002;). Papers discussing mechanisms of adaptation also focus on these. It is much more difficult to come across analyses that look at the role of attitudes and values less obviously tied to the sphere of family (such as struggle for autonomy) (Moors 2002). This is in spite of the fact that as we indicated earlier, ideational analyses tend to emphasize the effect of changes in general values and orientations. All this makes it reasonable for us to include in our analysis, whenever possible, also an examination of general value-orientations.

3. Data, variables

In this analysis, we have created our models simultaneously on four subsamples. We have looked at males and females separately in the two groups of (1) childless people and (2) parents (one or two children.) We used the entire data body collected in the first wave of the Turning Points of the Life Course survey as well as some variables from the second wave.

The first wave of data collection in the Turning Points of the Life Course survey was conducted between November 2001 and March 2002. Fieldwork for the second wave was conducted between November 2004 and July 2005. In the second wave, we managed to contact

[4] cf. contributions of the Lesthaeghe, Moors, 2002 collection.

87% of the surviving respondents from the first wave and collect from them subjective and objective, retrospective and current data. Our original sample was representative of males and females aged 18-75 in the first wave, in 2001/2002. In the course of modeling, we obviously had to narrow down the entire sample. Because we put questions regarding childbearing to females under 45 and males under 50, those older than this have been automatically excluded from the sample. We further lowered this age limit on account of the extremely low rate of childbirth in the older age groups. Also excluded from the analysis of first childbearing were those who had an uninterrupted student status between the two waves. Finally, in the course of analyzing ideational factors impacting the decision to have a second and a third child, we only took those into consideration who were living in a partnership at the time of the first wave of data collection. These limitations decreased the sample-size somewhat, however increased the structural homogeneity, which gave us greater opportunity to measure the effects of ideational factors. (See Appendix for the exact number of elements in the four sub-samples.)

Our dependent (explained) variable shows whether the respondents had a child born to them by the time of the second wave of the data collection. In the case of females, we also included data on women who knew themselves to be pregnant at the time of the second wave. (We omitted this supplementation in the case of males for the obvious uncertainties.) Because we wanted to examine value orientations influencing childbearing, we excluded from the analysis those women who were pregnant at the time of the first wave of data collection and men whose partner was already pregnant at that time[5]. It is important to clarify that in our present analysis, our dependent variable summarizes two components of behavior: it contains both the postponing and the renouncing one as well. For among those who do not yet have their first child, we find those who are postponing childbearing as well as those who are childless for good; among those with one or two children, we find those who postpone the second or third child as well as those who will not have further children. Of course, there is a strong correlation between the two behaviors, for it is very often that "postponers" become "renouncers" i.e. those who will remain childless. Still, it seems to us that the effects measured among childless individuals offer us a glimpse into the process of postponement[6] while interpreting data on parents contributes to our understanding of the differences in the number of children in the families.

Our independent variables, shown in the table, described the respondents at the time of the first wave. This feature of the model – that the dependent and independent variables are separated

[5] I.e. those respondents whose child was born within 6 months of the time of the data collection, thus they could be fairly certain at the time of the interview that they were going to have a child.

[6] Though the current situation seems to point to the possibility that the childless rate among those who are now in childbearing age will be higher than in earlier cohorts. Among those, who were born in 1965 16.6% were childless at their age 30, but among those, born 10 years later (1975) the corresponding ratio of childless was 36.0%.

from each other in time – allows us to regard our variables as *selection variables.* The explanatory and control variables used in the model can be summarized as below:

Childless samples	***Parents with one or two children sample***
Ideational variables	
ideal age for first child	
ideal number of children	ideal number of children vs. actual number of children
partnership ideal	partnership ideal
	satisfaction with partnership
Gender role ideal	gender role ideal
work vs. children	work vs. children
anomie-index	anomie index
future orientation	future orientation
religiosity	Religiosity
control/structural variables	
age	
	time since the birth of the last child
partnership status	
income class	income class
level of education	level of education
number of brothers/sisters	number of brothers/sisters
live with parents	

To measure the effect of *values* and *attitudes*, we created a great number of variable combinations and tested them in the course of our work. This process can never be regarded as finished, since our data makes it possible for new ideas and new combinations to emerge. At the same time, we have reached the stage in our research when our findings can be publicized for debate.

Of the attitudes and ideas closely related to childbearing, we first focused on the *age norm* associated with the birth of the first child (Cf. Settersen-Hagestad 1996) and the variable of the *ideal number of children.* In our analyze, we used not the figure provided by the respondent for him or herself (the so-called planned childbearing age) but the age which is generally regarded as "ideal" for becoming a parent by people of the same gender as the respondent, (Cf. Appendix) in other words, we took the general *perceived age norm* into consideration. We set up three categories for this variable: (1) *Early* (ideal age for becoming a parent under 25) (2) *Average* (25 for women, 25-30 for men) and (3) *Late* (ages older than these). The *ideal number of children* offered by the respondents is closely related to the planned number of children but

there is a difference between the two. The variable is different for parents and non-parents: for childless people, we used the ideal number of children, for parents, the difference between the ideal and the actual number of children (one or two). As it is apparent, our goal was to include in our models – for both the timing of childbearing and the number of children – the conditions regarded by the respondents as ideal and not their personal childbearing intentions.

It was a professed objective of our research *not to include fertility intentions* in the model since these largely come into existence as a result and consequence of the attitudes we are investigating (Philipov et. al. 2006) and our present objective is to measure the effects of values and attitudes. The inclusion of intentions – which reflect the effects of attitudes – into the model, only would interfere with our ability to measure the true effects of attitudes.

Initially and in keeping with the concept of "second demographic transition" we placed a premium on the *quality of partnerships*. The "satisfaction with partnership" variable designed to measure this could only be included in the course of analyzing the second and third births, since a significant part of the childless group was not cohabiting at the time of the first wave of data collection. Besides the satisfaction variable, we also worked out an attitude variable to measure individualization with regards to partnerships. The *partnership ideal* combines two different perspectives (opinions). One is sought through the question whether the individual's independence is important in a partnership, the other whether it was important to tie the knot and enter into a legal marriage once a child has been conceived (cf. Appendix). On the basis of these two variables, we differentiated between *individualist – mixed – traditionalist* partnership ideals, the last of which is observing community bonds and norms the fullest.

We designed a 6-component index to measure *social anomie*. (Cf. Srole 1956, Spéder et. al. 1998) This index involves lack of orientation, perception of life as meaningless, powerlessness, alienation from work, loneliness and angst (for the specific items, see Appendix).

We have experimented with ways of measuring the feeling of *insecurity* for a long time. The data at our disposal allowed us to construct a "worry scale." Ultimately, we decided against the inclusion of this variable in the model for two reasons. One was that the effects could only be detected in a bi-variate analysis and only faintly even there. The other reason was that our variable measuring *future outlook* (optimism vs. pessimism) seemed to incorporate the effect of the feeling of insecurity. We turned an 11-degree scale into 3 categories to measure future-orientedness. Responses given to the question "How satisfied are you with your future perspectives?" were marked on an 11-point scale (from 0 to 10) and categorized as follows: pessimistic (0 to 3 points), average (4-8) and optimistic (9-10).

Orientations and role conceptions regarding *gender roles* tend to be general but can also be tied to the world of the family. In the present analysis, we measured the degree of agreement

with the statement "Women with a good profession and good job are right to consider work more important than having more children"" (see Appendix). Responses made up the three categories of *modern – doubtful – traditional* (gender role conceptions). We also included in the model the conception of female roles and the work vs. family dilemma (see Appendix). This variable has the three categories of *family-oriented – doubtful – career-oriented*.

Both the general, fundamental value-orientations and attitudes closely associated with childbearing and partnerships were taken into consideration at the time of data collection. Of the general value-orientations, we included the variable measuring *religiosity* which can take four values between 1 (not religious) and 4 (religious).

There are significant differences in the models describing parents and non-parents with regards to the *control variables*. We have in both models one of the most important indicators of social status -- i.e. the highest level of education completed – income-class classification – i.e. one of the most frequently used indicator of material well-being — and the number of children, as a coarse but significant indicator of the socialization environment. Our *income variable* is based on the equivalent income (e = 0.73) most frequently used to generally describe one's material well-being and we broke it down into three terciles: low – average – upper[7]. Age-specific effects are designed to be controlled by the age group variable among the childless and by the "time elapsed since birth of first child" (continuous variable) among parents. So a person's *age* was only used as a control variable in the models analyzing childless people. In these models we divided males and females into three age groups. Among the women childless in 2001, we set up three age groups: 18-21, 22-26 and 27-35 – among the men, these were 18-23, 24-28 and 29-38.[8] In models explaining the subsequent childbearing decisions of people who, aged 18-39 in 2001, had one or two children, we used, instead of the respondent's age, the strongly related variable of time elapsed since the birth of last child as a control variable (continuous variable).

We incorporated two special control variables into the model for childless people: partnership status and whether the respondent lived in the parental house at the time of the first wave of data collection.

From the perspective of our study, we might regard *partnership status,* so important from the point of view of childbearing, as a structural situation, but we should also consider that attitudes and value orientations might also manifest themselves in partnership status. In other words, a partnership status might be a "result" of a person's value orientations. (Barber, et al,

[7] We experimented with a great number of other financial/material indicators – such as deprivation index – but none of them exhibited a significant effect in the course of modeling. Future analyses would make the further refinement of these indicators (e.g. individual income) possible and even necessary.

[8] The reason for the uneven segmentation is that we tried to make three proportionate groups out of the sample, based not on the number of elements but on the dependent variable.

2002) We set up six categories among childless people, taking into consideration the form and the length of time spent with the partner: (1) living alone, no partnership (2) partnership but no cohabitation ["dating"] (3) cohabiting, for less than three years (4) cohabiting, longer than 3 years (5) married, recent partnership, cohabiting less than 3 years (6) married, cohabiting longer than 3 years.

The logistic regression method compares the results to a *reference person*. In our models, the reference persons are somewhat divergent. For each variable, we will show the reference categories and give them the value of 1.

4. Findings

4.1 Receiving the first child, becoming a parent

Tables 1a and 1b show the effects of the different variables among women and men separately. Both tables are divided into five columns. The first column represents the uncontrolled effects which will be used as a reference at the later, interpretative stage: we will be comparing the values in the various models to these in order to explore effect mechanisms. In the first model (Column 2) we only measure the combined effects of ideational variables while Column 3 shows only the effects of control variables. In the third and fourth model ideational influences are measured in case using structural control variables. The difference between the third and the fourth (final/complete) model is that here partnership status is not represented. This allows us to clarify the correlation between partnership status and the ideational variables, for it is possible that the given attitude variable is a "consequence" of the partnership (adaptation)[9] or it may have played a part in bringing the partnership about (selection).

On the basis of the findings of the analysis performed on the sample of *women*, we can say that of the *norms* associated with childbearing, the age norm of first childbearing ("ideal age to become a parent") has an impact on the actual act of childbearing, while the ideal number of children – where positive deviances from the average reflect a family-centered attitude – does not. Those who think an earlier age is more ideal for becoming a parent are twice as likely to have their first child than those who indicated a later age as ideal (0.55). In other words, those indicating an earlier age as a norm listen more closely to their biological clock. While it is true that someone is more likely to become a parent if he or she indicated an earlier age as ideal for becoming a parent, the same thing is not true for the ideal number of children: those who

[9] The findings of Waite et. al. on the effects on non-conformist forms of cohabitation suggest this as likely.

indicated a higher number as being ideal are not any likelier to have their first child. The significance of the effect of the variable "ideal age" disappears under the effect of the variable of partnership type, though there is hardly any change in the value of odds ratios. It is our assumption that the norms of partnership situation and ideal age for becoming a parent mutually influence each other. We cannot be absolutely certain that this effect is due to the partnership situation – in fact, we suspect a mutual relationship, where the norm of ideal age for parenthood has an independent effect. (This supposed mutual relationship of course needs further exploration.)

The effect of the variable measuring *partnership ideal* is clear and significant in all models with virtually constant odds ratios. Less than half (0.44) of the "individualistic" women have the same likelihood to have children as the "traditionalist" ones.

We initially expected the *gender role conception* to have an effect on first becoming a parent – we presumed that those with a more traditionalist conception are more likely to become parents. However, among childless women, ideas and attitudes regarding gender roles do not seem to essentially influence the chances of becoming a parent. Even if with regards to uncontrolled effects of one of the variables, it is possible to detect a weak effect -- career-oriented women are less likely (0.74) to become parents than family-oriented women -- this effects disappears in multi-variant models and the differences between the odds ratios also decrease.

The *general value-orientation* and *perception of the quality of society* exhibit no significant effects on childbearing among childless women. Neither the intensity of religiosity, nor the intensity of perceiving social anomie nor future orientations had any effect on whether they had a child born to them in the three years under investigation or not.

As for our findings among *males,* some factors were observed to exert influences similar to what we found among women, still, the findings were far from identical. The effect of *norms* is identical among men and women and the effect of the ideal age for becoming a parent retains its significance even after the inclusion of the partnership variable in the model. Less than half (0.43) of those indicating a later age as ideal for becoming a parent exhibit the same likelihood for childbearing as those indicating an earlier age when the partnership variable is included in the model (Table 1b). Similarly to women, views on the ideal number of children have no impact on becoming a parent. Unlike in the case of women, however, ideas on partnerships among men had no impact on childbearing chances. The same is true for the conception men formed of gender roles.

In the area of *general value-orientations*, significant male-specific correlations emerge: their future outlook shows significant effect until the next-to-last model. The "optimistic" ones

are more than twice (2.4) to have children than the "pessimistic" ones. (Table 1b). In the last model which also includes the partnership variable, the odds ratio decreased only a little (down to 2.14) while the significance of the effect of the variable disappears. Again, we come up against the question whether the partnership situation influences the individual's optimism or the individual's optimism influences one's partnership situation. Because of the relatively high odds ratios, we assume that men's future outlook is not irrelevant from the perspective of childbearing. The other two general value-orientations (anomie and religiosity) seem to have no influence on the chances of childbearing among men.

Of the control variables, we will only mention the impact of the *partnership status*: the effect for both males and females is significant, comprehensive and in keeping with the expectations. Married couples are likelier to have children than cohabiting ones, while the latter are likelier to have children than those who are only dating. (Women living in a marriage for a short period of time are over ten times (10.85) likely to have their first child than those without partner – this figure for men is 19.55. The same women are three times (2.93) and the same men are about three-and-a-half times (3.58) more likely to have their first child than those who have been cohabiting for a short time. It is no surprise that of those people who are not living with a partner, those exhibit a higher chance for childbearing who are in some kind of partnership. And even those involved in such a rudimentary form of partnership as dating are significantly more likely to have children than those not in a partnership. These findings reinforce the common wisdoms that (1) a partnership is a precondition for childbearing (2) a traditional form of partnership (marriage) exhibits higher chances for childbearing than a more "modern" form of partnership (cohabitation)[10]. There is however, one surprising result we did not expect to see: the childbearing odds ratio in the case of the women living in long marriages (for over 3 years) is identical to that of cohabiting people. This finding requires further exploration.

[10] A more refined, future research may be also able to take into consideration the kind of partnership the respondent had at the time of conception and the features of partnership (short, long, stable or volatile).

Table 1a. Odds ratios of Logistic Regression Models Analysing the Risks Getting the first child (female) (Sample size, N=1094)

Independent variables, categories	Uncontrolled effects	'Ideational-variables'	Control-variable Model	No partnership model	Complete model
	Exp. (B)	Exp. (B)	Exp. (B)	Exp. (B)	Exp. (B)
IDEAL AGE	***	***		***	
Early (ref.)	1	1		1	1
Average	0.78	0.81		0.92	0.97
Late	0.45	0.49		0.55	0.68
IDEAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN					
0-1 (ref.)	1	1		1	1
2	1.36	1.34		1.23	1.28
3+	1.39	1.31		1.22	1.30
PARTNERSHIP IDEAL	***	**		***	***
Traditionalist (ref.)	1	1		1	1
Mixed	0.63	0.65		0.62	0.63
Individualistic	0.44	0.49		0.44	0.44
GENDER ROLE					
Egalitarian (ref.)	1	1		1	1
Doubtful	0.73	0.73		0.73	0.82
Traditional	1.14	0.96		0.91	0.98
FEMALE ROLE (work vs. family)	*				
Family oriented (ref)	1	1		1	1
Doubtful	0.66	0.69		0.71	0.73
Career oriented	0.74	0.88		0.90	0.93
ANOMIE-INDEX (continuous)					
(extent of Influence)	1.01	1.00		0.99	1.00
FUTURE ORIENTAION					
Pessimistic (ref)	1	1		1	1
Modal	1.04	1.07		1.18	1.25
Optimistic	1.01	1.03		1.10	1.08
RELIGIOSITY (continuous)					
(extent of influence)	0.93	0.97		0.97	0.98
AGE GROUP				**	
Young (ref.)	1		1	1	1
Medium age	1.35		1.09	1.51	1.28
„Old"	1.26		0.94	1.26	1.15
PARTNERSHIP STATUS	***		***		***
Alone (ref.)	1		1		1
Partner apart	1.94		1.88		1.78
Cohabitation, short	3.31		3.84		3.58
Cohabitation, long	4.38		4.61		4.47
Marriage, short	10.32		12.51		11.03
Marriage, long	3.68		4.32		3.70
INCOME CLASS			**		*
Lower (ref.)	1		1	1	1
Medium	1.04		1.05	1.08	1.07
Upper	0.83		0.67	0.84	0.69
LEVEL OF EDUCATION	***		**	**	*
Low (ref.)	1		1	1	1
Medium	0.51		0.57	0.59	0.62
High	0.58		0.74	0.63	0.77
NUMBER OF SIBLINGS (continuous)	**				
(extent of Influence)	1.29		1.11	1.12	1.11
LIVING WITH PARENTS	***			***	
No (ref.)	1		1	1	1
Yes	0.55		1.27	0.56	1.21
Nagelkerke R2		0.05	0.14	0.08	0.17

Note:: ***sig.:<0.01; **sig.:<0.05; *sig.:<0.1.

Table 1b. Odds ratios of Logistic Regression Models Analysing the Risks

Getting the first child (male) (Sample size, N=1480)

Independent variables, Categories	Uncontrolled effects	'Ideational-variables'	Control-variable Model	No partnership model	Complete model
	Exp. (B)	Exp. (B)	Exp. (B)	Exp. (B)	Exp. (B)
IDEAL AGE	**	**		**	**
Early (ref.)	1	1		1	1
Average	0.93	0.89		0.95	1.11
Late	0.35	0.33		0.35	0.43
IDEAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN					
0-1 (ref.)	1	1		1	1
2	0.83	0.72		0.70	0.84
3+	1.01	0.81		0.70	0.76
PARTNERSHIP IDEAL					
Traditionalist (ref.)	1	1		1	1
Mixed	0.85	0.83		0.94	0.99
Individualistic	0.87	0.88		0.84	0.91
GENDER ROLE					
Egalitarian (ref.)	1	1		1	1
Doubtful	0.86	0.91		1.05	1.31
Traditional	0.81	0.80		0.87	0.97
FEMALE ROLE (work vs. family)					
Family oriented (ref)	1	1		1	1
Doubtful	0.85	0.94		1.05	1.26
Career oriented	1.00	1.03		1.06	1.31
ANOMIE-INDEX (continuous)					
(extent of Influence)	0.98	0.99		0.99	0.99
FUTURE ORIENTAION	**	**		**	
Pessimistic (ref)	1	1		1	1
Modal	2.62	2.62		2.26	2.07
Optimistic	2.94	2.83		2.40	2.04
RELIGIOSITY (continuous)					
(extent of Influence)	1.00	1.02		1.03	1.07
AGE GROUP	***		**	***	**
Young (ref.)	1		1	1	1
Medium age	2.72		1.41	1.95	1.54
„Old"	1.99		0.71	1.07	0.83
PARTNERSHIP STATUS	***		***		***
Alone (ref.)	1		1		1
Partner apart	2.33		2.29		2.35
Cohabitation, short	7.65		5.16		5.48
Cohabitation, long	6.61		5.45		6.11
Marriage, short	28.26		19.16		19.55
Marriage, long	12.89		10.39		10.27
INCOME CLASS					
Lower (ref.)	1		1	1	1
Medium	1.30		0.96	1.13	0.92
Upper	1.27		0.93	1.05	0.89
LEVEL OF EDUCATION					
Low (ref.)	1		1	1	1
Medium	0.66		0.63	0.70	0.63
High	0.97		0.74	0.89	0.81
NUMBER OF SIBLINGS (continuous)	*				
(extent of Influence)	1.26		1.12	1.23	1.13
LIVING WITH PARENTS	***		**	***	**
No (ref.)	1		1	1	1
Yes	0.19		0.56	0.20	0.59
Nagelkerke R2		0.03	0.25	0.19	0.27

Note: ***sig.:<0.01; **sig.:<0.05; *sig.:<0.1.

4.2 Ideational factors influencing the birth among first and second child parents

At first glimpse, the effect of ideational factors seems to be stronger in the case of having the second or third child, since as far as the uncontrolled effects are concerned, 7 of the 8 variables in the case of women (Table 2a) and 5 of 8 in the case of men (Table 2b) exhibit significant effects. This is also supported by the indicators measuring the explanatory power of the models (Nagelkerke's R^2).

The directions of the effects of the various variables are in keeping with the expectations. Women are more likely to have children if: they deem a higher number of children ideal, hold more traditional views on partnerships, are more satisfied with their partnership, have a more traditional view of gender roles, are more oriented towards children than work, are less conscious of social anomie, more optimistic and more religious. (Table 2a). Among the men, much the same indicators describe the ones who are more likely to have children – the difference is that partnership role ideal, gender role ideals and religiosity have no significant effects. (Table 2b). The effects observable on the level of bi-variate are transformed on the multi-variate level: they partly lose their significant role and effect or rarely (in a single case) they become significant. Let us now turn to the details.

The effect of the three ideational variables can be observed throughout in the case of *women.* There is a clear effect of the *ideal number of children* on whether or not the respondent had a child conceived in the period under investigation. Wherever the ideal number is one higher than the actual number of children there is an increased likelihood (1.66) for the birth of the next child compared to people whose ideal number is identical or lower than the actual one. The same figure for respondents whose ideal number is much greater than the actual, this ratio is 6.35. (Let us not forget that this variable produced no significant effect in the case of childless people.) The effect of *religiosity* continues to be significant throughout, in keeping with expectations: the less religious the person is, the less like she is to become a parent (0.83). The effect of gender role attitudes is uneven but observable throughout: the work-oriented women ("Women with a good profession and good job are right to consider work more important than having more children") and those who tend to view gender roles as equal (disagreeing with "It is right if work is more important for the husband, and the home and children for the wife, even if they both work") are less likely to have children. People with more traditional gender role conceptions are more likely (1.54) to have children than those who profess gender role equality. Those agreeing with career-oriented women are much less likely (0.65) to have children than those who prefer family-orientedness.

Unfortunately, the variables measuring the quality of partnerships, the anomie scale variable and the future outlook no longer show significant effects in the multi-variate model. At the same time it is a fact that those who had children in the period under investigation were more satisfied with their partnerships in 2001 than those who had no children in this period (cf. Table 2a, uncontrolled effects).

The effects observable in the final model for *men* (Table 2b) are mostly different from what we saw in the case of women. Similarly to childless males and unlike in the case of women, the indicator for *future outlook* is the most stable in the case of male parents. Those assigned "optimist" are over twice as likely (2.26) to have children than those in the "pessimist" bracket. In keeping with expectations, the effect of *partnership ideals* is very stable, unlike in the case of women. Those preferring an "individualistic" partnership ideal are half as likely (0.44) to have children than those professing traditional partnership ideals. In our model containing only subjective elements, the effect of the norm of "ideal number of children" is significant, but this disappears in the final model, presumably due to the inclusion of the parity variable.

With regards to males with children, we would like to point out that of the uncontrolled effects, the anomie-scale appears to be significant (0.95) – but this also disappears at the inclusion of the future outlook variable. In this regard, the two variables measure similar aspects of attitudes. Again, we would like to recall our argument for omitting the variable measuring insecurity (worry scale). At the time, it was our observation that the variable of *future outlook* absorbs the weak but not at all insignificant effect of the worry scale. We assume a similar relation among perception of social anomie and future outlook as well.

Table 2a. Odds ratios of Logistic Regression Models Analysing the Risks Getting the second and third child (female) (Sample size, N=1322)

Independent variables. Categories	Uncontrolled effects	'Ideational-variables'	Control-variable Model	Completed model
	Exp. (B)	Exp. (B)	Exp. (B)	Exp. (B)
IDEAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN	***	***		***
Less (ref.)	1	1		1
Same	1.20	0.91		0.92
More	3.86	3.06		1.66
Much more	16.93	12.99		6.35
PARTNERSHIP IDEAL	*			
Traditionalist (ref.)	1	1		1
Mixed	0.58	0.60		0.68
Individualistic	0.67	0.77		0.98
SATISFACTION WITH PARTNERSHIP (continuous)	***			
(extent of influence)	1.65	1.35		1.20
GENDER ROLE		*		*
Egalitarian (ref.)	1	1		1
Doubtful	0.91	0.90		0.71
Traditional	1.41	1.55		1.54
FEMALE ROLE (work vs. family)	**			*
Family oriented (ref.)	1	1		1
Doubtful	0.60	0.67		0.57
Career oriented	0.63	0.69		0.65
ANOMIE-INDEX (continuous)	**			
(extent of Influence)	0.94	0.96		0.98
FUTURE ORIENTAION	**			
Pessimistic (ref)	1	1		1
Modal	1.37	1.20		1.27
Optimistic	2.20	1.71		1.53
RELIGIOSITY (continuous)	**	*		*
(extent of Influence)	0.80	0.83		0.83
BIRTH PARITY	***		***	***
first child (ref.)	1		1	1
second child	0.27		0.35	0.56
TIME SINCE LAST BIRTH(continuous)	***		***	***
(extent of influence)	0.79		0.80	0.81
INCOME CLASS	**		**	
Lower (ref.)	1		1	1
Medium	1.05		1.01	0.99
Upper	1.64		1.49	1.54
LEVEL OF EDUCATION	***		***	
Low (ref.)	1		1	1
Medium	0.61		0.49	0.59
High	1.11		0.83	0.72
NUMBER OF SIBLINGS (continuous)				
(extent of Influence)	1.12		1.29	1.27
Nagelkerke R2		0.18	0.23	0.29

Note:: ***sig.:<0.01; **sig.:<0.05; *sig.:<0.1.

Table 2b. Odds ratios of Logistic Regression Models Analysing the Risks Getting the second and third child (male) (Sample size, N=830)

Independent variables. categories	Uncontrolled effects	'Ideational-variables'	Control-variable Model	Completed model
	Exp. (B)	Exp. (B)	Exp. (B)	Exp. (B)
IDEAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN	***	***		
Less (ref.)	1	1		1
Same	1.17	1.04		1.04
More	4.09	3.30		1.31
Much more	8.19	7.71		2.78
PARTNERSHIP IDEAL	*	*		*
Traditionalist (ref.)	1	1		1
Mixed	0.61	0.59		0.62
Individualistic	0.48	0.47		0.44
SATISFACTION WITH PARTNERSHIP (continuous)				
(extent of influence)	1.17	1.08		1.07
GENDER ROLE				
Egalitarian (ref.)	1	1		1
Doubtful	1.28	1.64		1.87
Traditional	0.87	0.88		0.91
FEMALE ROLE (work vs. family)	**			*
Family oriented (ref.)	1	1		1
Doubtful	0.50	0.59		0.49
Career oriented	0.57	0.63		0.66
ANOMIE-INDEX (continuous)	*			
(extent of Influence)	0.95	1.00		1.03
FUTURE ORIENTAION	***	**		**
Pessimistic (ref.)	1	1		1
Modal	1.21	1.05		1.17
Optimistic	2.62	2.20		2.26
RELIGIOSITY (continuous)				0.27
(extent of Influence)	1.02	1.06		1.04
BIRTH PARITY	***		***	***
first child (ref.)	1		1	1
second child	0.21		0.27	0.33
TIME SINCE LAST BIRTH (continuous)	***		***	***
(extent of influence)	081		0.83	0.84
INCOME CLASS	***		*	***
Lower (ref.)	1		1	1
Medium	0.89		0.88	0.82
Upper	1.87		1.59	1.59
LEVEL OF EDUCATION	**			
Low (ref.)	1		1	1
Medium	1.03		1.16	1.23
High	2.02		1.65	1.76
NUMBER OF SIBLINGS (continuous)				
(extent of Influence)	0.94		1.09	1.03
Nagelkerke R2		0.15	0.22	0.27

Note:: ***sig.:<0.01; **sig.:<0.05; *sig.:<0.1.

If we look at the explanatory power of the various models (Nagelkerke's R^2) it will be apparent that among the childless (Table 1.a. and 1.b.), the combined explanatory power of the ideational variables is significantly lower than in the case of parents (Table 2.a. and 2.b.) The

corresponding measures are the followings: women: 0.03, men: 0.05 as opposed to women: 0.15 and men: 0.18. Comparing the power of ideational variables with the control variables, we find that these variables increase the effect of control variables only slightly in the case of the childless, while among parents (one or two children) such disproportionate development could not be observed. After including the control variables, ideational variables can still endow the models with significantly extra explanatory power among parents.

In both cases (i.e. people with our without children) we found that as far as women were concerned the explanatory power of the model including only ideational variables (Column 2) was greater. This, however was not true for complete models (last columns). The reason for this difference is the different explanatory power of control variables. While the combined explanatory power of the control variables in case of males is much stronger – somewhat surprisingly – than in the case of women, this difference could not be observed in models representing parents. In other words, there is no gender difference between the explanatory powers of the models in case of parents. On the contrary, the models representing the childless not only possess less explanatory power, but the extent of this power is different for the two genders.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we have looked at the effects of general values and fertility-specific attitudes on childbearing behavior in Hungary, a former Communist country, where demographic behavior – more specifically childbearing practices – is presently undergoing a transformation. For the analysis, we used data collected in the course of two waves of a follow-up survey. The dependent variable told us whether the respondent had a child born between the two waves of data collection or not. The explanatory variables contained the information from the first wave, thus it was possible to separate adaptive and selective effects, more precisely, we could explore the selective effects of ideational factors (norms, attitudes, conceptions.) When establishing the circle of possible explanatory variables, we used the theoretical approaches integrating ideational factors and attempted to create variables in keeping with the hypotheses articulated in said approaches. We conducted the analysis simultaneously on four subsamples. We looked at (1) men and women, (2) childless adults (parity0) and parents of one or two child (Parity1 and parity2)[11]

The different findings observed in the four subsamples supported our preliminary assumptions: (1) different factors influence becoming a parent (birth of first child) and having a

[11] See earlier in the paper for a more precise definition of the samples.

second or a third child, and (2) different perspectives and mechanisms are at work in the childbearing behavior of men and women.

It became obvious to us that *ideational factors play a significant role in childbearing.* We learned that after the birth of the first child, subjective factors play a more formative role: in both the starting and the complete models, values and attitudes had differentiated effects for both men and women.

The *norms* and *ideas* professed by the respondents play a significant part in the birth of the first child as well as the birth of subsequent children. But while in the case of the birth of the first child and its timing, the primary role is played by the *age norm* for becoming a parent, in the case of the second and third child, it is the *norm of the ideal number of children* that is of chief importance. (We were surprised to see that this latter norm had no effect on the likelihood of the birth of the first child, even though such effect mechanisms have been documented in the literature – e.g. Barber et. al. 2002.) These findings underscore that the new type of references that supplanted class and community norms in modern societies also fulfill a behavior regulating role and thus pay a part in the decision to become a parent. This also seems to suggest that we cannot postulate a purely calculating behavior behind the individualized decisions. These findings of ours are most consonant with those theoretical approaches that focus on age-norms (Neugarten, Hagestaad 1982, Billari, Liefbroer 2006) and the "planned behavior" concept of Fishbein and Ajzen. Of course we should also keep in mind that besides fertility norms, Fishbein and Ajzen's concept also includes the anticipated costs and benefits of future childbearing and the social control of behavior.

We experimented with a great number of variables in the course of the modeling in order to best measure the extent of individualization and drive for autonomy and finally decided on *partnership ideal* as the one most suitable to be included on our models discussing childbearing behavior. This means that those who place a premium on individual autonomy even in a partnership and refuse to adjust their partnership to community bonds are less likely to have children. This statement, however, is only true for childless women and male parents. The effect mechanism of this variable – similarly to our experience with the religiosity variable which only showed an effect when applied to female parents – fits very well with the logic of the second demographic transition. Our finding that among parents, the conception of gender roles exerts an influence of the number of children, can also be tied to this approach.

The perception of the quality of social coexistence (anomie index, general future outlook) primarily impacts men. Of the variables we looked at – including the worry scale omitted from the present analysis – it is the general future outlook (optimistic vs. pessimistic) that best captures the attitude which has a clear impact on men's decisions to have children. At this point

in time, it is difficult to say whether this provides arguments for Easterlin's approach, the theory of relative deprivation containing positive future perspectives or for the idea of "social disorder and anomie" or for the approaches emphasizing the importance of the role of insecurity.

Our assumption, being a sort of generalization, based on our finding is, that *among women, it is fertility-specific attitudes and norms that play a more significant role while in the case of men, the role of general perspectives* is more pronounced.

Finally, we would like to reiterate that the present paper cannot be regarded as a testing of the theories about demographic transition occurring in the former Communist countries since the beginning of the 90s. Such comprehensive testing would require such data collection and samples by which the ideational factors and indicators of the period before the political transition could also be measured. At the same time, we cannot posit that the significant ideational factors showing up in the model are not of a "transitory" nature, for the analysis of demographic behavior in the midst of an unfinished demographic transition necessarily contains "transitory effects." But one thing is for certain: it also contains the effects arising out of the plurality and differentiated nature (inhomogeneity) of the given society.

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Appendix 1: Distribution of the used categorical variables

Independent variables, categories	first child		second- and third child	
	female	male	female	male
IDEAL AGE				
Early (ref.)	14.7	6.4		
Medium	18.7	79.8		
Late	66.5	13.8		
IDEAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN				
0-1 (ref.)	12.6	13.8		
2	68.1	69.5		
3+	19.3	16.7		
IDEAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN				
Less (ref.)			4.6	5.9
Same			53.6	48.9
More			36.8	38.1
Much more			4.9	7.1
SATISFACTION WITH PARTNERS.				
(Un)satisfied (ref)			38.1	33.9
Very satisfied			61.9	66.1
PARTNERSHIP IDEAL				
Traditional (ref.)	14.6	13.7	16.6	13.9
Mixed	57.1	60.0	56.9	59.0
Individualistic	28.4	26.3	26.5	27.1
GENDER ROLE				
Egalitarian (ref.)	54.9	48.1	58.7	58.9
Doubtful	16.6	12.9	6.4	15.8
Traditional	28.5	39.0	34.9	25.3
FEMALE ROLE (work vs. family)				
Family oriented (ref)	65.3	47.5	63.1	46.4
Doubtful	9.0	21.1	11.8	8.6
Carrier oriented	25.7	31.4	25.2	45.1
FUTURE ORIENTAION				
Pessimistic (ref)	10.3	12.5	12.4	14.6
Modal	63.8	66.8	63.5	67.0
Optimistic	25.9	20.7	24.1	18.4
AGE GROUP				
Young (ref.)	32.2	44.4		
Medium age	45.1	35.0		
„Old”	22.6	20.6		
BIRTH PARITY				
first child (ref.)			42.9	46.0
second child			57.1	54.0
PARTNERSHIP STATUS				
Alone (ref.)	47.0	61.8		
Partner apart	26.2	19.1		
Cohabitation, short	10.7	7.8		
Cohabitation, long	3.9	3.2		
Marriage, short	6.3	4.3		
Marriage, long	5.9	3.8		
INCOME CLASS				
Lower (ref.)	21.4	21.8	34.3	30.7
Medium	38.9	39.4	42.8	41.9
Upper	39.8	38.9	22.8	27.3
LEVEL OF EDUCATION				
Low (ref.)	23.3	47.1	15.7	15.1
Medium	40.6	33.9	65.4	70.4
High	36.1	19.0	18.9	14.6
LIVING WITH PARENTS				
No (ref.)	29.1	23.5		
Yes	70.9	76.5		

Mean values of the used continuous variables

Independent variables, categories	first child		second- and third child	
	female	male	female	male
NUMBER OF SIBLINGS				
Mean (min, max)	1.37 (0, 11)	1.38 (0, 12)	1.58 (0, 16)	1.67 (0, 13)
Std. Dev.	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.6
ANOMIE-INDEX				
Mean (min, max)	6.68 (0, 18)	7.16 (0, 18)	7.19 (0, 18)	7.36 (0, 18)
Std. Dev.	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.3
RELIGIOSITY				
Mean (min, max)	2.49 (1, 4)	2.74 (1, 4)	2.37 (1, 4)	2.58 (1, 4)
Std. Dev.	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.0
TIME SINCE LAST BIRTH				
Mean (min, max)			7.1 (1,14)	6.5 (1, 14)
Std. Dev.			4.3	4,1

Appendix 2

Questions used to capture values, norms, attitudes, intentions:

Age norms of receiving the first child:
(males) In your opinion, what is the best age to have the first child for a man?
(females) In your opinion, what is the best age to have the first child for a woman?
(IF UNABLE TO SPECIFY AN AGE: What do you think: Rather before the age of 25, or rather over 25?)

Fertility norm:
(Based on the answers of the "ideal number of children" question)

(childless people): Three categories of the answer ideal number of children: 0-1 child; 2 children; 3 and more children.
-(parents): Difference between the ideal number of children and the actual number of children at the first interview: (1) ideal number is less then respondent's number of children; (2) ideal number of children and actual number of children is the same; (3) ideal number of children is more with one than actual number of children; (4) ideal number of children is much more than actual number of children;

Partnership ideal:
(constructed from the answers of two questions)

- How important are the following for a good marriage? Both parents able to pursue own, individual goals too. (Answer categories: (1) not at all important, (5) very important)
- In your view how important it is to get married if a woman becomes pregnant in a cohabitation and the parents would like to have the child?
  - Very important,
  - quite important,
  - not particularly, or
  - not at all important for them to marry?

Gender role attitudes:
It is right if work is more important for the husband, and the home and children for the wife, even if they both work. (Answer categories: Agree, Disagree, Respondent is uncertain)

Female role: work vs. family
Women with a good profession and good job are right to consider work more important than having more children. . (Answer categories: Agree, Disagree, Respondent is uncertain)

Anomie-index:
Look at CARD NO. X. Use it to indicate how true or typical the following statements are with regard to you.

- I have confidence in the future. (with negative weight)
- I have no influence over my everyday affairs.
- Life is so complicated nowadays that most of the time I don't know what to do.
- Anyone who wants to achieve something in life is forced to break certain rules.
- I generally don't enjoy work.
- No one cares what happens to other people.

(Answer categories: Fully true, Partly true, Rather not true, Not at all true)

Future outlook:
Now evaluate your general living conditions again. Look at CARD NO. X. on which 10 represents the best living conditions you can imagine and 0 the worst. What do you expect your living conditions will be in five years' time?

Religiosity:
Continuous variable (1= religious, according to the teachings of the church, 4= Not religious)