Movin' on Up?
Residential Mobility and Coupled Work Careers[1]

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Movin' on Up?
Residential Mobility, Gender and Coupled Work Careers

Abstract:

Theoretical perspectives on residential mobility typically view household level information as reasonable approximations of the outcomes for all individuals in the household. For many couple-headed households, however, residential mobility has different implications for the careers of each partner. We use matched data from the 2000-2005 March Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey to investigate the relationship between family status, residential mobility and short-term labor market outcomes for individuals and working-age couples in the United States. We find that, on average, (1) job-related residential mobility has a positive impact on married couple's household income, (2) couples that share equally in the pre-move household economy retain their gender balance following a job move, and (3) couples who move for job opportunities become even more gender-specialized in the labor market behaviors if there was a primary male breadwinner in the pre-move household.

Movin' on Up?
Residential Mobility and Coupled Work Careers in the United States

Americans are decidedly mobile. Every five years, according to recent Census data, about half the United States population changes residences. Each year over 3% of Americans move to a different state, a rate that is double to quadruple the rate for inter-regional moves in continental Europe (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2003). Not surprisingly, the American penchant for geographic mobility has been linked to the sheer size of the labor market, the lack of regional restrictions on labor mobility, and weak labor market institutions. The institutional features of the U.S. labor market facilitate rapid adjustments to regional shifts in labor demand and unemployment; critics maintain that the high rates of labor mobility in the United States reflect the lack of job protection and sparse social provisions of the American welfare state.

The past few decades have seen relatively little fluctuation in U.S. mobility rates, even as the economic composition of families and households has changed dramatically. The rise in dual-career households has apparently done little to dampen the enthusiasm of Americans for moving. This raises questions about how couples make the decision to move, and how the move affects not only the economic well-being of the household but also individual careers. One possible scenario is that the decision-making process in the mobile population has remained virtually unchanged since the days when the motivation for the move was to advance the household's well-being by investing in men's careers. In this scenario, women are "tied movers" in families where the husband's labor market opportunities take precedence over the wife's career. Research evidence from the latter half of the twentieth century indicates that men used to benefit from moves, while women's careers stagnated. However, no recent studies offer definitive evidence that would support or contradict tied mover theory. Little is known about gender differences in the career consequences of residential mobility among single men and women today, and no studies have addressed the long-term consequence of residential mobility for dual-career families.

This study takes an important first step towards addressing this gap in our knowledge at the intersection of mobility, gender, family and career processes. We address three specific questions: (1) Is there a gender gap in the relationship between geographical mobility and subsequent career outcomes? (2) To what extent can gender differences in career outcomes be explained by marriage and family? Finally, we pay special attention to the implications of residential mobility for marital partners: (3) How does moving affect the gender balance in the internal economy of couple-headed households?

We use the Current Population Survey to investigate the immediate career impact of relocation decisions among working-age men and women in the United States. We consider both local and long-distance moves, and consider whether moves motivated by job-related reasons differ from moves motivated by family and other reasons. Our strategy integrates theoretical and empirical insights from two distinct research threads. On the one hand, family researchers studying women's employment careers have emphasized the link between women's family situation and their labor force participation. On the other hand, researchers studying gender processes in the labor market have uncovered systematic inequalities in the trajectory of men's and women's employment careers. The two approaches have contributed important insights, but each is incomplete. Studies have shown that women's careers can best be understood within the context of family processes and the family life course, but scant attention has been paid to the importance of family for men's careers. Studies of job mobility have shown the importance of institutional mechanisms for individual outcomes, and how gender processes in the welfare state, in occupational and employer labor markets, and in the family contribute to aggregate-level gender inequality. Yet these studies' individualistic approach to career mobility has ignored the importance of joint decision-making in dual career families.

Studies of career mobility have shifted from a preoccupation with individual attributes to an understanding of the social institutions that structure labor market rewards. Although comparative research has shown that families and the institutional support for families are important components of any stratification and mobility regime, too little attention has been paid to the joint employment careers of women and men in dual-earner families. This paper contributes to a burgeoning literature that addresses this gap by asking whether the increasing complexity of family structures and family negotiations have undermined the career autonomy of American men.

Our study sheds light on the shifting set of gender and family negotiations that form the context of career decisions. At the individual and family level, these negotiations have implications for status attainment, income mobility, and gender equality within the household. At the aggregate level, the answers to these questions have important consequences for patterns of economic migration and opportunities for income mobility over the life course.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We begin with a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on migration and residential mobility, and outline our hypotheses for gender differences in career outcomes. Next, we describe our methodological approach and provide an overview of the data from the CPS before presenting evidence of the short-term career consequences of residential mobility for married and non-married individuals from the larger CPS sample. In our conclusion, we argue that the autonomy of men's career decisions has been undermined in recent decades by the increasing diversity of family forms and changes in the internal economy of families. At the same time, these changes may have enhanced women's power to make career decisions that may have implications for male partners and other family members.

Theoretical Background

Residential Mobility, Migration and Social Mobility

Research on geographic mobility can be loosely categorized in two different areas. On the one hand, research based on microeconomic theories has long linked geographical mobility and social mobility (Blau and Duncan 1967; Davis and Moore 1945). Studies in this tradition most often presume an instrumental motivation for the move and focus on changes in socioeconomic status and life chances in the aftermath of a move. In contrast, life cycle theory conceptualizes residential mobility as a consequence of events in a family's or individual lives. Studies in this tradition are less concerned with the outcomes of a move than with developing a framework that can explain variations in geographic mobility patterns over the life course and across households.

Theoretical perspectives on geographic mobility also vary depending on the type of move. A useful convention in the demographic literature is the distinction between moves across regional borders, typically denoted as *migration*, and moves within regions, which are usually

short-distance moves.[2] The primary insight underlying this distinction is that some changes in living quarters produce a ripple in an otherwise stable set of social structures and social interactions. For example, a move might change one's immediate neighbors yet preserve the daily interactions embedded in work, school, and church. Other residential moves result in a fundamental disruption of the social context of the household. Changes in language, laws, and links to social institutions are common in the case of international migration. But even in the case of internal migration, the reconfiguration of the household social context can have important structural consequences for the long-term well-being of migrating individuals and their families.

Most theoretical perspectives on migration follow the logic of microeconomic theory and are based on the presumption that geographical mobility is motivated by incentives for economic or status rewards (Greenwood 1975). Migration is viewed as the outcome of a calculation on the part of individuals and households of the costs and benefits of leaving one community for another. From a human capital perspective, migration can be seen as an investment in future income streams (Sjaastad 1962). Poor labor market conditions factor heavily into explanations for migration in the population and economics literatures. The international migration literature emphasizes differences in wage structures, returns to human capital, and risk structures across institutionally distinct labor markets (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, and Taylor 1993), while the internal migration literature emphasizes individual and structural unemployment as well as the lack of career opportunities (Greenwood 1969; Greenwood 1975). In each case, migration is perceived as an important mechanism for upward social mobility.

Historically, economic reasons have been shown to be the driving force behind large-scale migration movements as well as individual migration decisions. During the "Great Migration" in the first half of the 20th century, African-Americans who fled the south were motivated in large part by newly available job opportunities in northern factories (but see Bowles (1970) for differential rewards between African Americans and Whites for out migration from the South). The decline in northern manufacturing after 1980 was accompanied by a smaller wave of return migration among African-Americans leaving northern cities for the south (Tolnay 2003).

[2] The U.S. Census Bureau defines *migration* as a move across state or county borders, while moves within counties are referred to as *residential mobility* (cf Shachter, Jason P., Rachel S. Franklin, and Marc J. Perry. 2003. "Migration and Geographic Mobility in Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan America: 1995 to 2000." Census 2000 Special Reports No. U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, D.C.) Of course, these categories correspond imperfectly to actual distance moved, so that moves within a region may result in a different geographical labor market, while moves across regional boundaries sometimes imply no such change.

Structural disadvantage is not a necessary precondition for economic migration. Some long-distance moves may be seen as manifestations of Pareto's "circulation of the elite," in which privileged workers move freely across leadership positions in the political and economic arena (Mayo 1933). "Superstar" theories of executive mobility suggest that elite individuals develop reputations that span geographical borders and are widely sought after by organizational actors across geographical borders (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991; Rosen 1981). In all of these literatures, changing residences is perceived as an instrumental social behavior, and is associated with high status or upward mobility.

In contrast, the classic life-cycle model of residential mobility views the move as a response to life-course events (Clark and Withers 2002; Rossi 1955), especially family transitions, such as union formation or dissolution (Booth and Amato 1992). From this perspective, moving is not seen as an instrumental action to achieve upward economic mobility, but rather as a consequence of life events. Short-distance residential moves can and often do occur without any household member changing jobs, and work-instrumental motivations play a lesser role in this literature as compared to the migration literature (Bures 1998; Clark and Withers 2002; Speare and Goldscheider 1987). Adults move when they form or dissolve co-residential unions, renters move when they buy a home, growing or shrinking families move to larger or smaller quarters, and individuals and families move to different neighborhoods or school districts to improve their quality of life or schooling available to their children. Residential mobility is theorized to decline during adulthood, in part because family transitions tend to be concentrated in early adulthood, but also because community attachment increases with age. In short, life-cycle models are concerned with accounting for the timing of residential mobility. These models are largely agnostic with respect to the outcomes residential mobility, and the evidence on socioeconomic outcomes is inconclusive (South and Crowder 1997).

Another stream of research addresses residential mobility within poor, urban neighborhoods. Similar to the life-cycle approach, moves are not seen as instrumental in achieving a better socio-economic status. Rather, in the poverty literature, residential mobility is theorized as a consequence of poverty, associated with poor-quality housing, unstable housing arrangements, and missed rent payments. Empirical evidence shows that the poor move more frequently, and are less likely to move for job-related reasons, than the non-poor (Shachter 2001). As a consequence, low-income neighborhoods are often characterized by high rates of residential mobility, what might be called a "circulation of disadvantage."

Residential Mobility, Family Status, and Gender

Despite the dual emphasis on family processes and labor markets in much of the migration literature, integrating the two themes proved challenging. Economic theories of migration make explicit predictions about social mobility, but early research on women's migration outcomes was hampered by the poor fit between married women's residential mobility, in particular, and the theoretical premise that the motivation for moving is driven by independent rational actors maximizing individual gains. Life-cycle models treat family transitions as key determinants of geographical mobility, but these models are largely silent on the social mobility consequences of migration. Furthermore, they often do not take into account that the mobility of a family "unit" often encompasses the mobility of multiple wage earners, and do not put enough emphasis on the complex contextual mechanisms that determine family migration, in particular the role of social networks, family responsibility and care arrangements (Adams 2004; Bailey, Blake, and Cooke 2004).

Following Becker's (1973; 1974) extension of human capital theory to the economic analysis of marriage, Mincer (1978) proposed a human capital model of family migration. In the Mincer model, the criterion for migration decisions is household gain, rather than the potential gain of any individual member. Each migration decision is based on potential economic opportunities and costs to the entire household. As a consequence, migration can result in one partner experiencing upward mobility while the other partner, a "tied mover," experiences a career loss. Likewise, a "tied stayer" will forego a move whenever the individual career gain from migration is fully offset by a career loss to the other partner, resulting in no overall financial gain for the household from a potential move (Clark and Withers 2002; Mincer 1978). Although either partner can be a follower in the residential mobility decision, most labor market research borrows the specialization framework from the human capital model of the family. Men are likely to invest more heavily in their careers, while women have a comparative advantage in domestic labor. Consequently, when couples move, women are presumed to be the tied movers.

Empirical evidence to date is largely consistent with this gendered model of tied mover theory. For men, migration is generally associated with increased employment prospects, higher wage growth, and higher occupational status (Duncan and Perrucci 1976; Greenwood 1975). Among women, migration results in stalled careers (Markham, Macken, Bonjean, and Corder

1983; Maxwell 1988). Compared to women who do not move, women who move have an increased risk of employment exit (Boyle, Cooke, Halfacree, and Smith 2003; Lichter 1982; Long 1974), especially when children are present (Boyle, Cooke, Halfacree, and Smith 2003; Cooke 2001). Women who moved also experience slower wage growth (Maxwell 1988), and they are more likely to be underemployed (Morrison and Lichter 1988). Early research on dual-career marriages showed that migration probabilities increased with husbands' occupational prestige; wives' prestige and income contribution neither deterred nor encouraged migration (Duncan and Perrucci 1976). Evidence of wives as tied stayers can be found in the higher rates of overeducation among employed women in smaller labor markets (Büchel 2000; Büchel and van Ham 2003).

For previous generations, at least, the gender gap in migration outcomes is unsurprising given conventional beliefs about normative gender roles in the family. In a survey of Canadian couples who migrated in the 1980s, 80% of husbands and only 12% of wives were reported to have moved for employment reasons, two-thirds of wives but only 4% of husbands moved to accompany their spouse (Shihadeh 1991). Similarly, when questioned about hypothetical moves in a 1985 U.S. survey, women were less willing than men to move for economic gain, and more willing than men to follow a partner who took a new job in another city (Bielby and Bielby 1992). Baldrigde, Eddleston, and Veiga (2006) found similar results in their study of professional couples.

The evidence strongly suggests that migration increases household specialization and gender inequality by helping the career trajectories of men and hindering the careers of women. But there is some evidence that suggests that the female partner's economic position does factor into couples' residential mobility decisions (Bird and Bird 1985). In a recent study, Cooke and Speirs (2005) show that men as well as women can be tied movers, and that being a tied mover has a negative impact on labor market status, both for men and women. However, even today, women are much more likely than men to be tied movers. Other recent research explicitly examines the economic contributions of each partner. Cooke (2003) finds that at least for family migration, only the husband's income increases, and the wife's income, even give greater initial earnings potential, remains stagnant. Still, there remain several limitations on previous research.

First, few U.S. studies relate social mobility outcomes to actual reports of the reason for the move. Tied mover theory relies on the assumption that household moves are motivated by economic gain. As a consequence, measuring the outcomes of moving is not deemed necessary.

Life-cycle models of residential mobility suggest that economic gain is often secondary to other concerns.

Individuals and families relocate for a variety of reasons. Some moves may be instrumental, as proposed by the economic theories, such as moves for a new job or a promotion. This type of residential mobility can be classified as a "pull" move, where moving is voluntary and may be expected to be associated with benefits. Other moves are more likely to be "push" moves, where mobility is more or less forced or necessitated by existing strains. Moves for family reasons may not be motivated by economic reasons at all, and thus may differ in the consequences from instrumental job moves or moves out of financial necessity. Cooke and Bailey (1996) find, for example, that moves for family reasons may have a positive impact on married women's employment, quite different from what is expected by economic models.

Empirical evidence in the United States confirms that "most local moves, and many long-distance moves, occur for reasons other than labor market gains" (Clark and Withers 2002). Families might move in search of better housing or safer schools, renters may prefer to buy, couples might prefer a location that provides career opportunities for both partners over a move that might enhance the husband's career at the expense of the wife's career. This group of moves cannot easily be explained with pure human capital or relative resources models. Given the special nature of relationships, negotiations within couples and families about moving might be shaped by compromise.

Second, tied-mover theory assumes that the mobility decisions of single individuals can be seamlessly extended to the mobility decisions of households, yet previous research has not compared the mobility outcomes of singles to the mobility outcomes of couples. Again, life-cycle theory suggests that the mobility behavior of singles will be different from the mobility behavior of couples, with different motivations, different rates of mobility, and different outcomes. Singles may be more likely than couples to focus on labor market outcomes in mobility decisions. As one considers the outcomes of geographic mobility, be it labor force participation rates or income, one would expect that singles will benefit the most of moving as for them the ideal location is the one most beneficial for him or herself. Much of the research on women's mobility has focused on women's status as tied movers. It is unclear whether in the absence of family ties and responsibilities, single women's mobility behavior and mobility outcomes are comparable to that of their male counterparts.

Compared to singles, geographic mobility of those who live with their partners or who have families can be expected to be less beneficial. When comparing the income of single and married movers, the gains to married movers may be lower because they are thought to maximize the household gains, and not necessarily their own gains. Even when evaluating the overall gains, married individuals, even if they do not remain "tied stayers" but actually moved, may experience family migration as a process of compromise. Limitations in the choice of location might not only be limited to avoiding substantial income losses for a second earner in the family, but might also include consideration of children's well-being and potential future employment of a currently non-working spouse.

Third, tied mover theory implies that the household benefits of the move come at the expense of increasing gender specialization in the household, and previous research has focused on the career gains for men and career losses for women. However, previous research has not addressed gender differences among singles, and compared women's outcomes within marriage to women's outcomes before or after marriage. Within marriage, the presumption of traditional gender specialization is also misplaced: women contribute a substantial amount to household income in many two-career families. In our sample of U.S. dual wage-earners during the first five years of the century, married women contributed over one-third of household labor income, on average, and one-quarter of the wives earned more than their partners. Families may often seek strategies that allow both partners more flexible careers Families may be less willing to move for one partner's career than was previously thought, and families may be more likely than before to move for the advancement of the female partner's wife's career. Given these changes, it is crucial to investigate not only the *average* outcomes for individuals and couples who move, but the extent to which families exhibit diversity in these outcomes.

Hypotheses

This paper contributes to the literature linking residential mobility to social stratification and mobility in three ways. First, in contrast with previous research that imputes the motivation for the move from observed action and outcomes, we use direct measures of motivation. We analyze revealed preferences taken from movers' reports of why they were motivated to change residences, together with observed economic outcomes to investigate the relationship between social mobility and work-instrumental vs. alternative motivations. We further probe whether these outcomes vary by gender and family status. Second, we compare mobility motivations and

labor market outcomes among unmarried men and women to each other, and to the motivations and outcomes of married couples and single parents. This allows us to test whether gender differences outside of families mirror gender differences within families, and it allows us to assess the extent of diversity in mobility outcomes. Third, we study the impact of residential mobility on specialization in the internal economy of married-couple households. We examine changes in the gender balance of work hours and earnings within the household, in order to assess whether residential mobility increases specialization or gender equality.

Our research strategy is governed by the following set of hypotheses:

*H*1: Singles are more likely than married individuals or parents to move for job-related reasons

*H*2: The "returns" to geographic mobility are greatest for job-related moves

*H*3: Among married couples, moves across state and county borders are more likely to result in gains to household income than moves within a county.

*H*4: Among married couples, job-related moves are more likely to result in gender specialization in the household.

Data and Measures

We investigate residential mobility using data from the 1999-2005 March Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASES, formerly known as the Annual Demographic Supplement) of the Current Population Survey, merged with harmonized variables taken from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: CPS (IPUMS-CPS) data available from the Minnesota Population Center (King, Ruggles, Alexander, Leicach, and Sobek 2004). Each annual cross-section is constructed using the IPUMS-CPS as a base. We then match the data to the original CPS files in order to obtain additional variables and longitudinal panel identifiers. This produces a pooled cross-sectional file for 1999-2004, which we then match by household and individual to ADES data collected in March of the following year, i.e. 2000-2005[3].

[3] Each household selected for participation in the CPS is interviewed eight times, monthly for four consecutive months, followed by an eight month hiatus, then monthly again for four consecutive months. A "month-in-sample"

The March survey and its supplement solicit retrospective information about employment status, work hours, occupation, and income during the previous calendar year, as well as employment status and hours worked in the week prior to the survey. The ASES data are also a key source of information about residential mobility in the United States. All respondents are asked whether any household member (over the age of one) lived in a different house or apartment in March of the calendar year preceding the survey. If a move took place, the respondent is probed for the reason that the move took place. Each household member who moved is then coded with one reason for moving, beginning with the householder. All household members who moved with the householder are assigned the same reason for moving reported by the householder.

Pooled Cross-Section Data

Since our primary interest is in the social mobility consequences of moving for working-age individuals and families, we limit the analysis to householders and their partners aged 20-55 at the time of the move. We exclude individuals who moved from outside the United States in the previous year and individuals who were retired, disabled, in the military, or in school full-time and under the age of 25; we also exclude the partners of these individuals. We include only the first four rotation groups in each survey year, which should eliminate overlap in our pooled cross-section file; this also facilitates the matching process. The resulting cross-sectional residential mobility and labor force participation sample includes observations on over 170,000 households[4].

Matched Sample

In order to gain a wider window on the social mobility consequences of residential mobility, we produced a matched file linking information from the first March interview with each respondent at time t to their second March survey at time $t+1$ a year later[5]. Matching individuals across survey years in the CPS is difficult for several reasons: (1) The CPS is a survey or residences, not a survey of individuals, and individuals who move out of the residence

variable ranging from 1-8 identifies which rotation the household belongs to. Households participating in the March survey during their first four months in sample are also scheduled for participation in the following March survey.

[4] Expansion of the basic CPS and March supplement sampling frames in 2001 increased our sample sizes from roughly 15,000 in 1999 through 2001 to roughly 26,000 households in 2002, 2003, and 2004.

[5] We are indebted to Donna E. Leicach of the Minnesota Population Center for her generous assistance with the IPUMS data and for providing supplemental information to facilitate the matching process.

are lost to the survey. (2) The household identifiers available in the CPS public-release files throughout much of period covered by the data are not unique, even when combined with geographic identifiers, so care must be taken to avoid duplicate or mismatched records. Effective match techniques must combine household-level information with identifiers and survey responses at the person level. The response variables, including gender, ethnicity, age and education, are less reliable and more prone to measurement error than other identifiers. (3) Finally, as in all longitudinal panel surveys, respondents may exit the sample because of death, illness, disability, or refusal to participate in subsequent rounds of interviews.

We followed a variant of the matching procedure proposed by Madrian and Lefgren (2000) for the 1999-2002 base years. Beginning with the 2003 survey year, the March ASES files include an individual-level identifier that, while not unique, greatly facilitated the match process. We used a restrictive decision-rule that accepted the match only if (a) there was a perfect fit for all survey and geographic identifiers, sex and race, (b) immigrant status (but not necessarily year of arrival) matched in both periods, (c) education was the same or one level higher in the second period as compared to the first period, and (d) age in the second period was same as or up to two years older than age in the first period. The match algorithm resulted in match rates of 70-75% in 2000 and 2001 and 44-50% in the expanded samples. The first set of numbers is high relative to previously reported match rates, perhaps reflecting the relatively narrow sample that is being matched; we have not seen any reports of match rates using the expanded samples. Although our primary interest is in residential mobility, the structure of the CPS ensures that the matched dataset draws on respondents who do not move between the time they are first observed in these data and the following March survey.

Measures of Residential Mobility

Mobility is measured at the time of the initial survey at time *t* using reports of household residents who moved into the sample address during the twelve month period prior to the survey. Summary information is available on the location of the previous residence. Each move is coded as within the same county, from another county in the same state, or from another state. Respondents who report a move are also queried on the reason for the move, and asked to choose from seventeen response categories. We collapsed these categories as follows: *Job-Related Reasons* include “new job or job transfer;” *Family Reasons* include “change in marital status”

and "other family reason;" *Financial Autonomy and Independence Reasons* include "to establish own household," "wanted to own home, not rent," "wanted cheaper housing," and "to attend or leave college;" "to look for work or lost job." "and "other job-related reason;" *Quality of Life Reasons* include "to be closer to work/easier commute," "retired," "wanted new or better house/apartment," "wanted better neighborhood/less crime" "other housing reason," "change of climate," "health reasons," and "other reasons." We are especially interested in the outcomes for respondents who move for job reasons and family reasons, the former because it is likely to be associated with upward mobility, and the latter because the absence of a positive financial incentive for a move may be accompanied by downward mobility.

Measures of Individual Labor Market Outcomes

Labor market outcomes following a move are measured using matched samples. The earnings measures are calculated from respondents' reports of total annual wage and salary earnings in the previous calendar year. For self-employed workers, wage and salary income may be zero, or it may comprise a small component of their annual income from work, so we use the larger of this measure, and a second measure of the total income from the longest job held during the previous calendar year. The annual measure of job earnings is then divided by the number of weeks worked to produce a measure of average weekly earnings. This measure, and all economic measures, is calculated twice for each respondent in the match file. The initial measure, constructed from reports in March of year t, encompasses the pre-move period, and the measure is again constructed from reports in March of year t+1, which encompasses the post-move period.

Our measures of labor market outcomes following a move are not perfect. There a mismatch in the ASES survey between the timeframe for measuring annual income and the timeframe for reporting a residential move. Annual income is reported for the period beginning January and ending December of the calendar year prior to the March survey in which the income is reported. The twelve-month reporting period for moves is slightly later, since respondents report moves which occurred since March of the previous year through the March date of the survey. This implies that at least some respondents will report no more than three months of pre-mobility income in year t, and other respondents will report no more than twelve months of post-mobility income in year t+1. On average, however, the first-year reported is

dominated by pre-mobility income and the second year is dominated by post-mobility income. Our measures of the impact of mobility on earnings are imperfect, but they will capture differentials between pre-mobility and post-mobility earnings.

Measures of Household Material Well-being

We use two measures of household-level material well-being in married-couple households. The first is a measure of total labor market earnings, produced by summing the annual earnings reported by each spouse. Our second measure uses total household income from all sources, including wages and salaries; income from farms, business, and rent; government transfers and private transfers such as child support, alimony, and financial support from friends and relatives. We create a household equivalent income measure by deflating total household income by the square root of family size. This adjusted household income measure captures household standard of living in each period.

Measures of Household Specialization

We rely on two simple measures of household specialization in order to assess the impact of geographical mobility on the gender division of labor in families. The first measure captures the gender balance of the couple's labor supply. *Wife's share of labor supply* is calculated using retrospective reports on weeks worked in the previous calendar year and usual work hours during the weeks worked, capped at 70 hours per week. The product of these variables yields a measure of annual labor supply in the previous year, and wife's share is constructed as the ratio of wife's annual hours to the sum of each partners' total work hours. The second measure of household specialization is an earnings specialization measure calculated analogously to the labor supply specialization measure. *Wife's share of earnings* is calculated as the ratio of wife's total previous-year earnings to the sum of each partner's earnings.

The specialization measures, like the household income measures, are calculated for each of two consecutive years for all couples in the match file. This allows us to compare the outcomes of mobility for couples with conventional levels of gender specialization in the initial period to outcomes for couples with relatively equal divisions of paid work and earnings. We use 40% as the threshold level for wife's share of hours and earnings in a conventional household

division of labor, and we categorize couples as egalitarian if wife's share of hours and earnings is at least 40% in and less than 60% in the initial period.

Other Measures

We investigate variation in careers and material well-being following a move by gender and by family status. Individuals are assigned one of the following family statuses: Married with children, married without children, cohabiting without children (including cohabitants living with partner's children), single parents (including cohabiting parents), or single[6]

The individual earnings models use a human capital specification with covariates for years of schooling, a second order polynomial for imputed labor market experience, and an indicator for the implied school-leaving age to capture nonlinearities in the effect of education. Additional controls include indicators for race, ethnicity, and immigration status, as well as indicators for the year of the initial survey.

Analytic Strategy

Our research strategy begins with an analysis of the reasons why people move. We investigate the relationship between family status and motivation for geographical mobility, and we test for gender differences in reasons for the move among single men and women. We then use regression models to investigate the impact of geographical mobility on labor market behavior and earnings for individual movers. Finally, we analyze the impact of mobility on household specialization and gender equality within marriage.

Potential Sources of Bias in Estimates of the Effect of Residential Mobility

Conventional techniques for estimating the impact of residential mobility on labor force outcomes may be biased for several reasons. First, it is well known in the international migration literature that individuals who migrate may possess unobserved characteristics, which make them more likely to move. If these unobserved traits are also correlated with labor market outcomes such as earnings, ordinary least squares estimates of the relationship between moving and earnings will be biased. For example, suppose that ambitious individuals are both more aggressive about maximizing earnings regardless of whether they have moved, and more

[6] Respondents who indicated a same-sex partner were excluded from the analyses.

geographically mobile than their less ambitious peers. Omitting ambition from the estimation equation will bias the results, suggesting a stronger positive effect of mobility on earnings than is actually the case. Couples may also have unobserved characteristics that make them more or less prone to gender specialization, and these preferences for specialization may influence the decision to move. Fixed-effects estimation using panel data provide one solution for the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. Assuming that the unobserved characteristic and its effect on the outcome of interest are both time-invariant, fixed-effects estimation will produce unbiased estimates of the effect of residential mobility on earnings. We produce fixed effects estimates for all results using the matched data.

A second source of bias can occur when moving is associated with the selection of either partner out of the labor force. Any analysis of post-mobility earnings must account for those individuals and couples who select out of the labor force following the move. We address selectivity in our individual earnings analyses using a maximum likelihood Heckman selection estimator. The model uses a probit equation to estimate the probability of labor force participation at the end of the observation period as a function of pre-mobility characteristics of the individual and household,[7] and the results are incorporated into the final estimation of the earnings growth equation.

Our analyses of outcomes for couples use a different strategy to account for selectivity of either partner. Rather than using statistical techniques to try to remedy the selection bias, we present separate models for population subgroups of interest. We begin by analyzing outcomes for all couples. We then show separate results for dual-earner couples and couples in households characterized by a male breadwinner and a female homemaker following the move. Our reasoning is straightforward. While we are interested in describing the typical outcome for couples who migrate, we are less convinced that there is a need to identify the structural effects of moving on coupled careers. Instead, we choose to focus on the two most prominent outcomes of residential mobility among couples. Over 60% of the couples in our sample of movers were dual-earner couples before and after the move, and another quarter were breadwinner-homemaker households following the move.

[7] The probit equation includes the same variables as the earnings equation, along with a measure of household income excluding this person's earnings and indicators for home-ownership and number of young children in the household.

Results

Residential Mobility Behavior and Motivation by Family Status, and Gender

Table 1 sets the groundwork for the multivariate analyses that follow by comparing geographic mobility behavior among households headed by women, men and couples. The top panel shows that singles and cohabitants are more likely to have moved than married couples, whether or not there are children in the household. Cohabitants have the highest mobility rates, with about one-third reporting a new residence since the previous year. This high rate of mobility suggests that many cohabitants moved in the process of forming a union, and indeed one in three cohabiting couples reported different migration histories for each partner. Single women's mobility levels are not significantly different from those of single men. Single parents are less likely to move than single men, but the most dramatic differences exists between single men and married individuals, whose odds of moving are only about one half of those of male singles, for married couples with children, the odds of moving are even 60% lower than for singles.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Once the decision to move has been made, gender and family status have only limited impact on the distance moved. Single men and women and married parents have similar odds of moving across state lines. Cohabitants have somewhat lower odds of making long distance moves, and married couples without children have higher odds of migration. Single parents, however, are much less likely to move across state lines than childless singles and other types of households. This may represent, in part, the "circulation of disadvantage." Low rates of interstate moves may also reflect judicial constraints on geographic mobility imposed by the courts as part of a post-divorce child custody agreement[8]. Local moves are the majority for all household types, but about one-fifth of all moves are across state borders.

The lower panel of Table 1 presents the motivations for residential mobility among men, women, and couples who moved during the previous year. Less than one-third of all moves are motivated by job or family reasons. There is little variation in the reasons for move by family status. The odds of moving for job reasons are similar for childless singles and married individuals with and without children. Cohabitants and single parents, however, have significantly smaller odds of moving for job reasons. Family reasons seem most prevalent among cohabitants and those with children. While moves for autonomy reasons are concentrated among

[8] U.S. family courts have jurisdiction within a single state. The court decision may specifically bar a parent from moving out of state, or may require renegotiation in one or both jurisdictions.

the unmarried, quality of life moves seems to occur disproportionately among the married. Overall, the results do not support our first hypothesis: singles are not significantly more likely than married to move for job-related reasons, even though they are generally more mobile.

Residential Mobility and Individual Labor Market Outcomes

Next, we turn to an investigation of the labor market outcomes of geographic mobility. Table 2 presents estimates for the one-year impact of the move on weekly earnings, for men and women who are employed and working at the time of the survey. These estimates correct for selection out of the labor market, which is appropriate for the male sample as well as the female sample because of the relatively high rates of exit among movers. The results presented in Table 2 are descriptive in nature, as the show the overall level of weekly earnings, not taking into account earnings prior to the move.

Panel A shows no immediate gains for men from the move, single fathers even seem to experience an earnings loss. For single women, with and without children, mobility also is associated with an earnings drop, whereas married women's earnings are not significantly impacted by the move.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Panel B shows that for men, the impact of a move varies further by distance. Moves across state lines are linked to 7% earnings gains for married men, but not for singles. Local moves, on the other hand, the most prevalent type of move, are associated with earnings losses for married men and single parents, but with earnings gains among singles.

The results for women are quite different: Across state moves negatively affect the earnings of married women and single mothers, but not those of childless single women. On the other hand, within county moves do not affect married women, but have a negative impact on singles with and without children.

Panel C illustrates the impact of the motivation for a move and shows that there are substantial gender differences in the way reasons for moves operate. Job related moves are associated with earnings gains childless singles and married men. For women, on the other hand, there are no obvious benefits for job moves for childless singles and married women, but marginally significant earnings losses among singles mothers. This suggests that hypothesis 2 is only partially supported. For men there is some evidence that those who moved for job reasons

benefit most. However, for women hypothesis 2 is not supported by the findings presented in Table 2.

Family moves benefit male childless singles, but have negative effect on the earnings of married men and single childless women. As could be expected, moves for autonomy reasons, which can mostly be categorized as push moves, are associated with lower earnings for all groups except married women. Since these the results from the linear model on the earnings after a move do not account for the causal impact of mobility on earnings, we next estimate fixed effects models of the impact of moving on average weekly earnings. This does not only account for a variety of unobserved characteristics that may affect earnings, but also isolates the impact of mobility on earnings.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

The fixed effects estimates suggest that mobility has only a small short term impact on earnings, with only single men benefiting from residential mobility overall. Moving does not have a significant impact on women's earnings. Distance of move only plays a limited role as well. Among childless singles, moving locally leads to higher earnings than not moving, but for the other groups of men and other types of moves, movers' earnings are not different from stayers'. For women, long distance moves significantly reduce married women's earnings, but there is no similar effect for the other group or for other types of moves.

Panel 3 shows the fixed effects estimates of the effects of moves by motivation. We find that for married men there is some evidence for earnings benefits from job moves, but not for other groups of men and not at all among women, again there is no overall support for the greater benefits of job moves as proposed by hypothesis 2. Family moves, on the other hand, have a symmetric effect for men and women, in that we find a negatively effect on earnings for married men and women, but not for singles.

The comparison of the results of Tables 2 and 3 is particularly interesting. The fact that the earnings benefits for cross-state moves for married men disappear in a fixed effects model, suggest that there is appositive selection into this kind of move; with ambitious men with higher earnings making this kind of move. Similarly, the earnings benefits we find associated with job moves disappear for single men and are very much attenuated for married men, further suggesting that there is a positive selection into job moves. Estimating the fixed effect model attenuated much of the impact of family moves on men earnings, there is no longer an impact on

single men's earnings. And while there is an earnings drop associated with married men's moves for family reasons, the net drop is only about 7%, less than half of the earnings penalty suggested in the OLS model. This suggests that men who have lower earnings potential are more likely to move for family reasons.

For women, the results look quite different. While the lower earnings associated with long distance moves disappears for single women in the fixed effects context, this negative outcome persists for married women at a bout the same magnitude. The marginally significantly lower earnings associated with job moves for single mothers in the descriptive OLS context of Table 2 disappears once we estimate the fixed effects model.. For women, on the other hand, the lower earnings of singles that moved for job reasons are attenuated, but instead the results suggest that married women experience a 10% earnings drop if they move for job reasons. These two results suggest that single mothers who may be in more precarious financial situations are the ones to move for job related reasons, but overall job moves do not affect their earnings. Among married women however, it seems that there is a negative net effect of moving for job related reasons, and this earnings drop was concealed in the descriptive OLS results of Table 2 because relatively better off wives move (with their husbands) for job related reasons.

Residential Mobility and Couple's Labor Market Outcomes

We have seen that residential mobility can affect individual labor market outcomes for men and women, but the question remains how moving affects material well-being and the gender division of paid labor in married couples. Figure 1 provides a first look at the differences between married movers and stayers in their labor market behavior. Figure 1 shows that most couples are dual-earner couples in both observation periods, whether or not they move, and most couples do not change their overall employment status from year to year.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

However, household employment transitions are more common among movers. In the year following a move, breadwinner-homemaker couples are more likely to become dual-earner couples, and dual-earner couples are more likely to shift to breadwinner-homemaker couples, as compared to couples that remain in their previous residence. Figure 1 also shows some evidence supporting the tied-mover hypothesis. Movers with children are least likely to have two earners in the early period, and the proportion of homemakers increases in the year following the move

The next set of analyses addresses income and work outcomes for couple-headed households. We ask, first, whether residential mobility is associated with short-term material gains to couple-headed households. We then consider the effect of residential mobility on the gender division of paid work hours, and on earnings equality within the household.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Table 4 shows fixed-effects regression estimates for the change in couples' material well-being following different types of moves. The first column shows the effect of geographic mobility on total job earnings from both wife and husband, and the second column shows the effect on total household income (adjusted for family size), including income from government transfers, child support and alimony, dividends and interest, as well as job earnings. Consistent with economic theory, these results show that job-related moves increase a couples' earnings by nearly 8%, but the impact on household income is smaller in magnitude and only marginally significant.

As we expected, the evidence indicates that different types of moves are associated with very different earnings mobility outcomes. Couples who moved for family reasons experience a reduction in their joint earnings of 7.5%, and this decline is magnified in the household income equations. Moves for autonomy or quality of life reasons do not have a significant effect on total earnings and household income, and net of the reason for move, local moves have the same effect as moves across county or state lines.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

The disparities in the economic consequences of job-motivated and family-motivated moves raises the question of how different types of moves affect the household division of labor. Table 5 shows results from the fixed-effects analysis of gender specialization in the household. The first two columns indicate that women's share of couples' labor supply, and women's share of couples' labor income, are not significantly affected by household moves. This result is puzzling given our previous findings that job-related moves increase household income, and moves for family-based reasons. The evidence changes, however, when we separate couples in households where men are the primary breadwinners from households where husbands and wives share relatively equally in paid work. Table 5 shows that women in households with a

normative gender specialization see their share of earnings and paid work hours decline by between two and three percentage points following a job-related move, while women who are relatively equal contributors prior to the move do not experience a significant change in their post-move share. These results can be interpreted as evidence that women are most likely to be "tied movers" when they are secondary breadwinners. Women who take on a major breadwinner role in the internal economy are less likely to experience career losses in the aftermath of a move.

Interestingly, the evidence also suggests that wives' contributions to the household are an important form of household insurance. Women who were secondary earners prior to a move motivated by a desire for autonomy are likely to see their breadwinner role increase following the move. The results for women in egalitarian households are in the opposite direction, but not significant.

TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

The importance of women's pre-move contributions to the household as a predictor of household specialization after the move is affirmed by the next set of analyses. Table 6 shows results from a fixed-effects logistic regression estimates of the probability that a married woman will reduce her labor supply from full-time to part-time, or exit the workforce entirely, in the year following a residential move. The first column shows a result that is entirely consistent with tied mover theory. Overall, married women who move for job opportunities have odds of reducing their labor supply that are one and a half times greater than women do not move. The remainder of the table shows sharp disparities in women's outcomes, however, depending on the strength of their breadwinner role prior to the move. In secondary earner households, women who move for job opportunities have over twice the odds of reducing their labor supply. In contrast, married women in equal breadwinner households are less likely to reduce their labor supply following a job-related move, with odds just over one-third as large as their peers who not experience a job-related move. Again, these results affirm the importance of women's breadwinner roles in mobility decisions and household outcomes. Unlike earlier studies, we do not find a significant effect of moving for family reasons on women's employment probabilities.

Summary and Discussion

We used individuals' reports on their motivation for moving in the past year to investigate material well-being and labor market outcomes of residential mobility by family status, distance and reason for move. We expected that, given the overall higher mobility among singles, single men and women would also be more likely to move for job related reasons than married couples and parents. This is particularly based on the notion that childless singles have fewer constraints to their mobility, and are thus able to take advantage of job opportunities that may require a move without inconveniencing a partner. However, this expectation is not supported by our findings. We do find that cohabitants and single parents are significantly less likely to move for a job opportunity, but there are no differences in job related mobility between singles and married couples with and without children.

Our descriptive results did support the economic perspective that mobility is an instrumental choice that should produce earnings gains. However, our expectation that moving for job opportunities is associated with the largest benefits is not entirely supported by the results by the fixed effects estimates. Only married men experience marginally significant earnings gains from job related moves. The disparities in the results between the two models indicate strong selection effects; men with higher earnings potential seem more likely to move for job opportunities.

We find that once the unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account, we cannot find any significant earnings gains from moving for job opportunities for women; our results also do not provide no evidence for the earnings losses predicted by tied mover theory. We find that both quality of life moves and moves that seek to increase autonomy do not have a direct impact on earnings. The former was to be expected, since financial circumstances are not a part of the mobility decision. However, one could have expected that those who move to improve their financial circumstances may experience gains. It may be that any payoffs of those push moves based on financial are not immediate and will only materialize in the long run.

Our findings imply that the lack of gains to job motivated residential mobility cannot be blamed merely on tied mover status or compromises made in mobility decisions, since we find benefits for neither single men nor women. It is possible that looking at the long term consequences of residential mobility may change some of these findings.

Our interest for this paper was not only in individual outcomes, but also in the potential impact of residential mobility on couples' economic circumstances and gender balance. We expected that long distance moves, more so than local moves, should be associated with material gains to the household, reflecting New Home Economics. However, we find no differences in the payoff for residential mobility by distance of move net of mobility motivation. We do find, however, that at the household level, job related moves increase both earnings as well as the standard of living for couples. Moreover, we also find that moves for family reasons have a negative impact on household economic well-being, regardless of the distance of the move. These findings appear to contradict our third hypothesis, however, job related moves are disproportionately non local moves, so this finding underlines the heterogeneity of long distance moves.

We also investigated to what extent mobility affects gender specialization within households. We expected that job related moves would increase gender specialization. We find that when averaged out across all married couple households, residential mobility does not have a significant effect on household specialization this would appear to contradict our fourth hypothesis. However, we find that when women are secondary breadwinners prior to the move, moving for job related reasons further reduces their share of household earnings and labor supply resulting in greater gender specialization. Among couples where both partners contributed equally to the household internal economy, job related mobility does not impact this balance. Similarly, we find that women who were secondary earners were more likely to reduce their labor supply following a job related move, whereas wives who shared equally in the internal economy are more strongly committed to the labor force following a job related move.

This clearly suggests that women whose participation is secondary to their husbands are at risk of becoming tied movers and may see their breadwinner role further eroded by moves motivated by husbands' job opportunities. In this respect, job centered mobility may be polarizing for married women's economic standing. Those who were not equal participants in the household economy face the risk of being pushed out of the labor market following a move, while women who are relative equals seems to solidify their participation and avoid being tied movers and the negative consequences associated with this status. At the same time we see no evidence that men become tied movers in equal breadwinner households.

Taken together, our findings suggest that residential mobility can produce economic benefits for individuals and couples, but the individual benefits are most clearly evident for men.

For married couples, we find clear evidence that moves in response to job opportunities increase household earnings and standard living. At the same time, we find persistent evidence that women who are secondary earners before a move, become tied movers. Job related moves exaggerate existing gender disparities in labor supply and earnings. We do see evidence that women who share equally in the breadwinner role prior to the move are unlikely to become tied movers. This suggests that women's economic power in the pre move household is an important determinant of the mobility decision and its economic consequences.

Table 1. Residential Mobility in the Previous 12 Months by Gender and Family Status. Adults 20-55, Pooled March CPS Cross-Sections 1999-2004

Movers vs. Stayers:	Single Men	Single Women	Cohabitants	Single Parents	Married, no Children	Married, Children
Stayers	76.8	77.0	66.6	77.5	87.0	89.2
Movers	23.2	23.0	33.4	22.5	13.1	10.8
Observations	14,650	11,626	8,266	22,024	34,185	106,505
Odds Ratio for Move	1	0.98	1.56**	0.89**	0.50**	0.38**
"Distance" of Move:			Movers Only			
Between States	19.9	19.4	15.8	13.9	22.5	20.3
Between Counties	22.3	22.1	20.5	17.7	23.7	20.6
Within County	57.8	58.5	63.6	68.4	53.8	59.1
Observations	3,245	2,527	2,520	4,405	4,266	10,320
Odds Ratio for Long Distance Move	1	0.95	0.81**	0.69**	1.22**	1.001
Motivation for Move:			Movers Only			
Job	12.86	11.47	8.29	4.57	13.16	12.86
Family	13.45	12.48	19.86	22.63	16.97	11.68
Autonomy	25.05	27.51	24.1	20.84	14.21	12.02
Quality of Life	48.64	48.54	47.75	51.95	55.66	63.44
Observations	3,245	2,527	2,520	4,405	4,266	10,320
Odds Ratio for Job Move	1	0.85	0.545**	0.329**	1.047	1.092

Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ $p<.10$ * $p<.05$ ** $p < .01$, two-tailed tests

Table 2. Average Weekly Earnings Differentials at t+1 for Movers vs. Stayers by "Distance" and Reason for Move, Men and Women by Family Status

Panel A.	Men			Women		
	Unmarried	Single Parent	Married	Unmarried	Single Parent	Married
Move	0.020	-0.099*	-0.012	-0.059*	-0.098**	-0.009
	(0.020)	(0.045)	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.018)
Panel B.	Moves by "Distance"					
	Men			Women		
	Unmarried	Single Parent	Married	Unmarried	Single Parent	Married
Between States	-0.066	-0.190	0.071**	0.004	-0.209*	-0.111*
	(0.042)	(0.127)	(0.026)	(0.047)	(0.098)	(0.051)
Between Counties	-0.007	-0.111	-0.038	-0.056	-0.032	-0.006
	(0.045)	(0.115)	(0.036)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.036)
Within County	0.051*	-0.075	-0.031+	-0.078**	-0.093**	0.020
	(0.022)	(0.049)	(.018)	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.021)
Panel C.	Moves by Reason for Move					
	Men			Women		
	Unmarried	Single Parent	Married	Unmarried	Single Parent	Married
Job	0.091*	-0.290	0.124**	0.024	-0.182+	-0.062
	(0.045)	(0.238)	(0.032)	(0.056)	(0.104)	(0.053)
Family	0.083*	0.061	-0.180**	-0.106*	-0.092+	-0.051
	(0.037)	(0.096)	(0.060)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.041)
Autonomy	-0.082*	-0.260*	-0.187**	-0.138**	-0.319**	-0.105*
	(0.035)	(0.123)	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.112)	(0.048)
Quality of Life	0.029	-0.100*	0.017	-0.028	-0.029	0.021
	(0.027)	(0.050)	(0.016)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.022)
Observations	8746	1971	36560	6938	6118	31272

Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p<.10 * p<.05 ** p < .01, two-tailed tests

Notes:
Models include additional control variables (not shown): dummies for year of initial survey, years of schooling, implied age when left school, a second order polynomial for labor market experience, race, ethnicity, and immigration status.

Table 3. Fixed Effects Estimates of the Impact of Moving on Average Weekly Earnings at t+1 by "Distance" and Reason for Move, Men and Women by Family Status

Panel A.	Men			Women		
	Unmarried	Single Parent	Married	Unmarried	Single Parent	Married
Move	0.032+	-0.054	-0.005	-0.005	-0.025	-0.014
	(0.017)	(0.044)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.014)
Panel B.	Moves by "Distance"					
	Men			Women		
	Unmarried	Single Parent	Married	Unmarried	Single Parent	Married
Between States	0.015	-0.172	0.017	0.040	-0.068	-0.105**
	(0.047)	(0.142)	(0.027)	(0.045)	(0.062)	(0.037)
Between Counties	0.037	-0.062	-0.012	-0.025	0.069	-0.035
	(0.034)	(0.122)	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.028)
Within County	0.034+	-0.026	-0.009	-0.011	-0.040+	0.021
	(0.019)	(0.045)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.016)
Panel C.	Moves by Reason for Move					
	Men			Women		
	Unmarried	Single Parent	Married	Unmarried	Single Parent	Married
Job	0.049	-0.315	0.055+	0.060	-0.011	-0.023
	(0.045)	(0.217)	(0.031)	(0.055)	(0.099)	(0.046)
Family	0.043	-0.078	-0.070*	-0.031	-0.034	-0.107**
	(0.039)	(0.100)	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.035)
Autonomy	0.039	-0.138	0.034	0.028	-0.048	-0.083+
	(0.032)	(0.102)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.050)	(0.044)
Quality of Life	0.021	-0.003	-0.010	-0.023	-0.017	0.016
	(0.022)	(0.052)	(0.013)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.016)
Observations	8746	1971	36560	6938	6118	31272

Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p<.10 * p<.05 ** p < .01, two-tailed

Notes:
Models include additional control variables (not shown): dummies for year of initial survey, change in years of schooling from t to t+1, change in squared labor market experience.

Table 4. Fixed Effects Estimates of the Impact of Residential Mobility on Labor Income and Total Household Income

	HH Labor Earnings	HH Total Adjusted Income
Within county	0.017	0.020
	(0.024)	(0.023)
Job	0.075*	0.051+
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Family	-0.079*	-0.100**
	(0.038)	(0.037)
Autonomy	0.033	0.008
	(0.043)	(0.040)
Quality of life	-0.017	-0.022
	(0.022)	(0.021)
Observations	37128	37101

Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ $p<.10$ * $p<.05$ ** $p < .01$, two-tailed

Notes:
Models include additional control variables (not shown): dummies for year of initial survey, change in years of schooling from t to $t+1$, change in squared labor market experience, change in spouse's years of schooling, change in spouse's squared labor market experience.

Table 5. Fixed Effects Estimates of the Impact of Residential Mobility on Couple's Labor Supply and Earnings Contributions to the Household

	All couples: Wife's share of ….		Couples with wife's contribution <40%: Wife's share of ….		Couples with wife's contribution ≥40-60% Wife's share of ….	
	Labor income	Work hours	Labor income	Work hours	Work hours	Labor income
Within county	0.009	0.002	-0.012	-0.022+	0.022	0.018
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Job	-0.015	-0.015	-0.027**	-0.024*	-0.013	-0.006
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.029)	(0.019)
Family	-0.014	-0.013	0.013	0.012	-0.016	-0.027+
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.016)
Autonomy	-0.014	-0.002	0.042*	0.052*	-0.045+	-0.037+
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.020)
Quality of life	-0.005	-0.006	0.006	0.015	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Observations	37128	37128	23340	15896	9494	13788

Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ $p<.10$ * $p<.05$ ** $p < .01$, two-tailed

Notes:
Models include additional control variables (not shown): dummies for year of initial survey, change in years of schooling from t to $t+1$, change in squared labor market experience, change in spouse's years of schooling, change in spouse's squared labor market experience.

Table 6. Odds Ratios for the fixed effects estimates of the probability that a wife will exit the workforce or reduce from full-time to part-time work following a move

	All Households	Wife's share of HH labor income <40%	Wife's share of HH labor income 40-60%
Within county	0.981	1.003	1.227
	(0.161)	(0.189)	(0.583)
Job	1.561*	2.161**	0.359*
	(0.291)	(0.451)	(0.172)
Family	1.319	1.227	2.360
	(0.352)	(0.376)	(2.572)
Autonomy	0.879	0.729	0.802
	(0.202)	(0.211)	(0.505)
Quality of life	1.142	1.226	0.785
	(0.167)	(0.204)	(0.326)
Observations	6810	5194	1051

Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ $p<.10$ * $p<.05$ ** $p < .01$, two-tailed

Notes:
Models include additional control variables (not shown): dummies for year of initial survey, change in years of schooling from t to $t+1$, change in squared labor market experience, change in spouse's years of schooling, change in spouse's squared labor market experience.

Figure 1. One-Year Changes in Couples' Employment Status